Volume 25, Number 3, Summer
The concept of psychologist as clinical scientist has found increasing support in recent years from diverse corners of professional psychology. Yet differences in how these advocates understand the nature of clinical scientific practice persist, fueled by philosophical differences over the nature of knowledge. Two epistemological paradigms that are the center of much discussion in contemporary philosophy are briefly explained: internalism vs. externalism. Modern clinical psychology has emerged largely within an internalist theory of knowledge. While psychologists have discerned important features of how one obtains knowledge in a clinical setting, it is argued that these discoveries are better positioned in an externalist epistemology. The implications of externalist clinical science for a number of relevant topics are discussed including: whether there is, or should be, a normative scientific method, the role of clinical judgment as a source of knowledge, and how science can be demarcated from pseudo-science without presupposing a methodological hegemony.
Requests for reprints should be sent to William L. Hathaway, Ph.D., Director, Doctoral Program in Clinical Psychology, Regent University, 1000 Regent University Drive, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464–9800. Email: email@example.com.
Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel’s recent “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness,” which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as follows: “Inner awareness is . . . an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode.” And Kriegel describes Woodruff Smith’s conception as denying inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious mental-occurrence instance’s content. Unlike Woodruff Smith, Kriegel holds every conscious mental-occurrence instance presents itself therein too; it does so “secondarily,” giving itself less attention than it does its primary object (e.g., the sun in a case of visual perceiving). I examine here three arguments that Kriegel discerns and opposes in Woodruff Smith’s discussions in favor of inner awareness’s being a part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience — which part is held to modify (or qualify) the (sole) presentation involved in the experience. In addition, I devote some attention to two positive arguments of Kriegel’s against the thesis that inner awareness is such a feature. However, I do not find Kriegel’s negative or positive arguments contra Woodruff Smith’s account to be compelling.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., 635 SW Sandalwood Street, Corvallis, Oregon 97333. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
The article explores the influence of unproven specificity of pathogenesis manifested in clinical psychiatry and research. A selected literature review of studies attempting to identify a biological marker is presented. To date, the search for a biological marker to establish a psychiatric diagnosis has been unsuccessful. Clinical settings and programs are described which seem to be driven by psychological issues, one such example being the search for villains. Thus, specific assumptions about etiology affect therapy technique and treatment planning and may be disadvantageous to patient care. Biological and psychological development in all of its phases is subject to a diverse range of perturbations, intrinsic as well as extrinsic. A flexible, balanced view is called for before specificity is extended to general theories, which, in turn, affect therapy and treatment settings.
The author would like to thank Robert Sobel, M.D. for his insightful comments and valuable guidance in the organization of the manuscript. Requests for reprints should be sent to Lawrence Greenman, M.D., c/o Perrone, 3489 Zurich Court, Carson City, Nevada 89705. Email: email@example.com.
It seems that time has direction which points ahead from the past to the future. Traditionally, the main efforts to explain the arrow of time were carried out within the domain of physics, primarily utilizing statistical mechanics laws. Here, I attempt to explain how the forward direction of time is configured from the viewpoint of the mind. At first impression the concept of forward direction stems from the meeting of subjectivity with space and as such it is applied to time. However, I show that the forward direction of time has a unique temporal sense not derived from space. Later I relate phenomenological explanations of the flow of time to the direction of time.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Eliaz Segal, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Mangan’s hypothesis, that consciousness is an information-bearing medium, presents an alternative to Dennett’s brand of functionalism, and Dennett’s counterattacks have yet to address Mangan’s main assertion. The medium hypothesis does not entail Cartesian theater assumptions concerning the localization, causal status, and “filling in” of consciousness in the brain. In principle, it is compatible with distributed information transfer between different media, epiphenomenalism, and gaps in visual experience. However, Mangan’s strongest empirical argument, based on consciousness’ limited “bandwidth,” does not necessarily show that transduction between media of different information-bearing capacities occurs between the brain and consciousness. The features of consciousness that he attributes to a lower bandwidth medium can be explained in terms of functional constraints on a single medium. Furthermore, empirical results showing gaps and anomalies in visual experience speak against consciousness being a medium.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Karl F. MacDorman, Ph.D., Department of Adaptive Machine Systems, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University, 2-1 Yamada-oka, Suita, Osaka 565–0871 Japan. Email: email@example.com
Mein Körper Sagt Mir, Er Will Nicht Mehr Tanzen. Krankheit als Signal und Chance [My Body Tells Me It Doesn’t Want to Dance Anymore. Illness as Signal and Chance]
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 2004, Volume 25, Number 3, Pages 259–266, ISSN 0271–0137
[Note: First two paragraphs, no abstract available.] Barbara Klose–Ullmann’s book, written in German, Mein Körper Sagt Mir, Er Will Nicht Mehr Tanzen. Krankheit als Signal und Chance, grew partially out of her own experience with a potentially fatal illness, a brain tumor. Her diagnosis, her life-saving but also dangerous operation, her convalescence, and her successful return to an active life style brought about major changes in her outlook on illness and on life. When Klose–Ullmann then met a friend who had recently been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, she decided to explore how others coped with illness and to write about her findings. This book differs from others about illness in its scope and intent. It is a compendium of interviews with seriously ill people, from a variety of backgrounds. All chapters are succinct first-person accounts of their experiences and reliance on their own methods for dealing with illness. The interviews follow people from diagnosis through treatment to often difficult life changes. The range of illnesses described, and the differences among the interviewees, give readers a broad perspective. A bibliography at the end of the book lists other helpful health-related literature.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Eva Brams, LCSW, 4 Washington Square Village, Apt. 17–I, New York, New York 10012–1910.
Collision of Wills
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 2004, Volume 25, Number 3, Pages 267–270, ISSN 0271–0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] To die is to leave unfinished business. We live, our lives end, and the sad jest of it all is that nothing else does. Even for the anomaly who “lived a full life,” the question remains as to what the deceased might have accomplished if only he or she had lived longer. With creative people, well-intentioned friends and family members often try to force the departed’s unfinished work into the category of “finished,” to varying degrees of failure. In literature and rhetoric, James Berlin’s Rhetoric, Poetics and Cultures comes to mind. Though the text is a credit to Berlin’s place in his field, he died before its completion. Was the draft that was published even close to Berlin’s final vision? It is unlikely. Witness the proliferation of “rag and bone stew” recordings released after a pop star’s demise or the veneration of a thespian’s final curtain, no matter how compromised the material might have been. Bruce Lee’s film Game of Death (1978) saw release half a decade after his demise but differed severely from Lee’s original vision. Rather than represent Lee’s philosophy of Jeet Kune Do on celluloid, the film resembled something closer to the hackneyed martial arts films he loathed, with stand-ins donning Lee’s yellow track suit to finish out the film. Roger V. Gould did not live to see the publication of his text Collision of Wills, dying from leukemia before its completion. While the insights within are significant, it was and remains an unfinished work.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Scott Stalcup, Department of English, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809.