Volume 15, Number 4, Autumn
The Depersonalization of Creativity
Paul G. Muscari, State University College of New York at Glens Falls
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 311-322, ISSN 0271-0137
Since much of modern discourse, extending from cognitivism to connectionism, has been greatly inclined to look at human behavior in relation to processes where the subjective factor plays little if any causal role, it would not be inaccurate to say that the person has been left with but a trivial part to play in the overall script. The intent of this paper is to address this theoretical disproportionality by offering a more symmetrical account of creativity C one that reconsiders the reconstructive nature and generative capabilities of the person while not ignoring the contributions of technical and scientific thought.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Paul G. Muscari, Ph.D., 28 Broadacres Road, Queensbury, New York 12804
The Unconscious: A Perspective from Sociohistorical Psychology
Carl Ratner, Humboldt State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 323-342, ISSN 0271-0137
This article extends concepts from Vygotsky’s sociohistorical psychology to explain unconsciousness. Freud’s conception of the unconscious is criticized for minimizing the importance of social and cognitive aspects of unconsciousness. In contrast, sociohistorical psychology explains unconsciousness as emanating from social values. These social values organize the manner in which we perceive people, and therefore account for oversights and distortions in our perception of self and others. Implications for overcoming unconsciousness are also discussed according to sociohistorical psychological principles.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Carl Ratner, Psychology Department, Humboldt State University, Arcata, California 95521
How the Brain Gives Rise to Mathematics in Ontogeny and in Culture
Larry R. Vandervert, American Nonlinear Systems
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 343-350, ISSN 0271-0137
Within the framework of Neurological Positivism (NP) this article describes how brain algorithms are translated into mathematics in ontogeny and in culture. The purpose is to address seemingly contradictory research findings that suggest that while mathematical axioms are innate, they are not the direct result of processes of selection. It is proposed that self-referencing feedback processes of maximum-power evolution guide the construction of algorithmic isomorphies between preadapted brain algorithms and mathematics. It is concluded that maximum-power evolution as described in NP offers mechanisms that make sense of findings that suggest that mathematical axioms are innate, yet not directly the result of selection as traditionally understood. It is concluded also that these mechanisms provide insight into the often intuitive nature of mathematical discovery.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Larry R. Vandervert, American Nonlinear Systems, West 711 Waverly Place, Spokane, Washington 99205-3271
An Introduction to Reflective Seeing: Part II
Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 351-374, ISSN 0271-0137
After two sections of background discussion regarding (a) some views of inner (second-order consciousness, ancient, modern, and present-day, and (b) some recent deployments of James J. Gibson’s ecological approach to visual perception relevant to our understanding of reflective seeing, I present my own view of reflective seeing for the remainder of the present article. Although I include detailed references to Edmund Husserl’s conception of straightforward perceptual consciousness and reflective perceptual consciousness, the present article is not about Husserl. Rather, I use quotations from and about Husserl to add resonance and depth to my own conception of the complex psychological process that is reflective seeing – particularly, the stream of perceptual consciousness that is a product and a part of it, that flows at the heart of reflective seeing. It will be evident that I very largely agree with the Husserl material which I use. And I do not take the space to bring out any disagreements that I might have with him. Thus, this article has as its main purpose making known, in an introductory way, just one, my own, view of reflective seeing.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, California 95616-8686
The Structure of Awareness: Contemporary Applications of William James’ Forgotten Concept of “The Fringe”
David Galin, University of California, San Francisco
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 375-402, ISSN 0271-0137
Modern psychology does not address the great variety of elements constituting subjective experience or the relations among them. This essay examines ideas on the fine structure of awareness and suggests a more precisely characterized set of variables, useful to all psychologists interested in awareness, whether their focus is on computer simulation, neuroscience, or clinical intervention. This view builds on William James’ insight into the qualitative differences among the parts of subjective experience, a concept nearly forgotten until recently reinterpreted in contemporary cognitive terms by Mangan. I review, revise, and expand these ideas, and suggest their application to self-monitoring in several domains, including metacognition, action, and emotion. Sharpening and extending the distinctions James drew among key descriptive aspects of awareness gives us a more differentiated vocabulary for research and theory.
Requests for reprints should be sent to David Galin, M.D., Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, California 94143-0844.
Handbook of Stress: Theoretical and Clinical Aspects (second edition).
Book Author: Leo Goldberger and Shlomo Breznitz (Editors.). New York: Free Press, 1993
Reviewed by Ian R. Nicholson, Victoria Hospital
Journal of Mind and Behanior, Au tumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 403-404, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] The publication of the second edition of Goldberger and Breznitz’s Handbook of Stress has been eagerly anticipated. The first edition, published in 1982, became a standard general reference book for stress research. It included 46 chapters by the leaders in stress research, covering the wide spectrum of research from basic psychological and physical processes to therapy. It is against this reputation that the second edition will need to be compared.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Ian R. Nicholson, Ph.D., Adult Outpatient Psychiatry, Victoria Hospital, 375 South Street, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 4G5
The Nature of True Minds.
John Heil. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992
Reviewed by Jonathan Thomas, Loyola University of Chicago
Journal of Mind and Behavior, Au tumn 1994, Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 405-408, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] Though the title of this book is a bit ambitious, its content does indeed grapple with one of the most difficult post-Cartesian problems of the philosophy of mind. It seeks to address the mind-body problem, employing the logic and language of the supervenience theory, while at the same time preserving a notion of intentionality that is not necessarily reducible (I think) to neurophysiological accounts of human behavior or activity. The presentation of the argument is careful, systematic and disciplined, though it may prove to be challenging reading for those unaccustom to its analytical style of argumentation and less accessible to those who are unfamiliar with modal logic in general and with the growing “supervenience hypothesis” literature in particular.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jonathan Thomas, Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626