CANADIAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

An Historical Sociological Approach • 2nd Edition

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

CHAPTER 5

THE RETURN OF THE NATION

Canada suffers in many respects from the same ailments as Québec. In fact, Canadian nationalism is also in the process of congealing under the weight of myths and dogmas that are becoming obstacles to the country's evolution.

—journalist Alain Dubuc, LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture, 2001

That this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada.

—motion passed by the House of Commons, November 27, 2006

We coexist by recognizing the volatility and not wanting to disturb it.

—John Wright, Ipsos Reid polling, 2008

INTRODUCTION

Since 1970, Quebec and Canada had held constitutional negotiations designed to address Quebec's grievances and resolve their different visions of the country. The defeat of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords removed constitutional change, at least for a time, as a means of doing so. What options now remained? Effectively, there seemed only two options. Either Quebec could accept the status quo and perhaps sign the current Constitution, or it could reject the status quo and push for independence.

This chapter begins with an examination of the 1995 Quebec referendum, through which the Parti Québécois government sought a mandate to pursue this second option, and events since that time, including the House of Commons' recognition of Quebec as a nation in 2006. The chapter also examines sociological questions regarding individual and collective identity, the power exerted by symbols and metaphors in shaping group solidarity and conflict, and the issue of minority rights within a multicultural society. Finally, in anticipation of the book's next section, the issues of nation and state are reconsidered in the context of globalization and the threat posed by the United States to both the Québécois nation and English Canada.

A NEAR-DEATH EXPERIENCE: THE 1995 QUEBEC REFERENDUM

On October 30, 1995, Quebecers once more voted in a referendum on sovereignty. Canadians watching on their televisions saw their country come within a few thousand votes of being fundamentally changed, perhaps disintegrating altogether.

The referendum was presaged by three major events. First, the separatist Bloc Québécois elected 54 members to Parliament in the 1993 federal election, suggesting widespread support for independence within Quebec (Appendix 1). Second, the BQ's provincial counterpart, the Parti Québécois, led by Jacques Parizeau (1930–), won the Quebec provincial election in September 1994 with a commitment to pursue sovereignty. Third, the PQ tabled a draft bill on sovereignty, following by public consultations throughout Quebec during the early part of 1995 (Balthazar, 1997; Conway, 1997).

It was clear from the beginning the vote would be close. Polls conducted since the 1994 Quebec election showed support for sovereignty stable at 45 percent (Conway, 1997: 214), a significant base upon which to build. Moreover, the sovereigntist camp believed the referendum question was sufficiently benign as to attract "soft" voters. By contrast, federalists were hamstrung by the fact they appeared to have nothing concrete to offer Quebecers. The defeat of the Meech Lake Accord (Chapter 4), in which Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chrétien again had been instrumental, had foreclosed the possibility of constitutional renewal, at least

for a time. All Chrétien and Canada's other leaders could offer was the status quo, liberally sprinkled with threats should the *Yes* side prevail (Conway, 1997: 219).

Moreover, even these threats were bound to be less successful than in 1980. First, Quebec's economy in 1995 was far more developed, and Quebecers felt more secure. Second, francophones made up a larger proportion of Quebec's business class in 1995 than in 1980. Though not stridently nationalist, many remained at least neutral in the 1995 sovereignty debate. Third, English-speaking Canada's constant reminders that Quebec is a net beneficiary of federal transfer payments fell on deaf ears, partly because such reminders are insulting and partly because many Quebecers do not believe this to be the case (Valaskakis and Fournier, 1995). (Many Quebecers outside the Montreal area do not directly see the benefits of transfer payments, which often go to large corporations; in consequence, the alleged economic downside of separation is lost on people in the rural areas of Quebec, who often face double-digit unemployment.)

As referendum day approached, many ordinary Canadians outside Quebec felt fearful, angry, bewildered, and powerless. On October 27, a unity rally was held at Canada Place in Montreal. The *No*-sponsored rally attracted between 30,000 and 150,000 people, many of them from outside the province, loudly declaring their love for Quebec. No doubt, these expressions of affection were sincere. But, as Balthazar (1997: 58) notes, "Since those Canadians had nothing to offer but their words of love, they gave Quebecers the image of an all-inclusive Canada that did not allow for the recognition of Quebec's uniqueness."

The impact of these events upon the referendum's outcome is uncertain. A study of polls conducted during the period suggests voting intentions remained fairly stable throughout and that the impact of Bouchard's increased prominence during the latter part of the campaign was negligible (see Fox et al., 1999). Likewise, the pro-federalist Montreal rallies may have made those in attendance feel better, or may have driven undecided voters into the *Yes* camp, or may have had no impact at all.

Few televisions in Canada were silent on referendum night 1995. The *Yes* side took a seemingly commanding lead in the early stages, and jubilation reigned among its supporters. Gradually, however, the outcome turned as results came in from Montreal Island. Nearly all of Quebec's eligible voters—90 percent (4.7 million people)—cast ballots, the final result being that 50.6 percent voted *No* while 49.4 percent voted *Yes* (Morton, 1997: 340). A swing of less than 30,000 votes would have changed the referendum's outcome (Young, 1998).

As in 1980, the 1995 referendum split not only Canada but also Quebec. The *Yes* side won strong support from francophones, about 60 percent of eligible francophone voters (compared with 50 percent in 1980). The *Yes* side also won strong support in Quebec City and rural Quebec, from middle-class and better-educated voters, and from union supporters. In contrast to 1980, the *Yes* side also received some support from business, though business in general remained on the sidelines of the sovereignty debate (Conway, 1997: 217). Polls conducted prior to the referendum also suggested that sovereignty appealed especially to those 35–44 years of age and males slightly more than females, though the gap had lessened (Trent, 1995). By contrast, the *No* side fashioned its close victory from about 40 percent of francophones and almost all anglophones and allophones, mostly located in Montreal (Fox et al., 1999), not to mention northern Quebec's small but politically powerful Cree and Inuit peoples (Conway, 1997: 219), thus opening up new and important ground for discussing the future of Aboriginal peoples within Canadian society (see Part 3).

MULTICULTURALISM, SECULARISM, AND CIVIC NATIONALISM

On referendum night in 1995, an obviously distraught Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau remarked that the pro-sovereignty side had been defeated by "money and the ethnic vote" (quoted in Conway, 1997: 220; see also Balthazar, 1997; Morton, 1997). Reproached by colleagues and opponents alike for his divisive remarks, a remorseful Parizeau resigned the next day and was succeeded shortly thereafter as Quebec premier by Lucien Bouchard.

In broad statistical terms, Parizeau's observations leading to his resignation were correct. Francophones in Quebec *do* disproportionately favour sovereignty; non-francophones *do not*. His remarks, however, were divisive in singling out all members of Quebec's allophone community as being opposed to Quebec nationalism—indeed, being unpatriotic (Balthazar, 1997: 59). As such, Parizeau's comments unearthed debates within Quebec and the Parti Québécois itself about who is a true Québécois and the nature of Quebec nationalism.

As noted in Chapter 3, traditional Quebec nationalism was cultural and inward looking. It traced its ancestry through bloodlines to the original 10,000 *Canadiens* of the St. Lawrence. Old Quebec nationalism was anti-modern, tribal, and *Catholic*. Vestiges of it still exist today, expressed linguistically through descriptions of people as either "*Québécois pur laine*" (literally, "pure wool") or "*Québécois de souche*" ("later arrivals") (Ignatieff, 1993: 172).

But Quebec, like the rest of Canada, has changed a great deal since the 1950s. The new nationalism that arose then was modern, democratic, territorial, pluralistic, and secular even if (as previously noted) most Quebecers still nominally declare themselves members of the Catholic faith. In theory, the new nationalism welcomes anyone living within Quebec's borders willing to accept the values of Quebec society. In practice also, this is the case. Most Quebecers today view their nationalism as civic, not ethnic (Ignatieff, 1993: 169; also Smith, 1998).

In this context, the Bloc Québécois released a policy document in 1999 suggesting that language, culture, and history define Quebec identity, but that anyone living in an independent Quebec would enjoy equal rights (*Edmonton Journal*, 1999a). Nonetheless, the debate over who is a Québécois continues in Quebec.

An important element of this debate is the role of secularism. As already noted, the transformation from old to new nationalism in Quebec was tied to the decline of the Catholic Church's authority. Shortly after this transformation occurred, however, Quebec also began dealing—as did the rest of Canada—with the arrival of new immigrants, many from neither francophone nor anglophone countries who still hold strong religious beliefs.

The concern expressed by many Quebec francophones is not simply whether new immigrants will support sovereignty (a specifically nationalist concern), but how immigrants can be successfully integrated into modern—and *secular*—Quebec society. These concerns arise always around specific incidents that take on larger symbolic meaning, such as a court ruling on one occasion that a Sikh student could carry a *kirpan* (religious dagger) to school and in another instance when a youth belonging to the Islamic faith wanted to wear a *hijab* (head scarf) while playing soccer, which was against league rules. Some Quebecers viewed the new immigrants as trying to fundamentally change the province's traditional culture and reacted with anger, the response garnering the most notoriety when the small town of Herouxville established a policy saying that immigrants must conform to local culture.

In search of an answer to the perceived rise of cultural and religious divisions, in February 2007 the Quebec government

established the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Government of Quebec, 2007). The commission's mandate was to examine accommodation practices in Quebec; to examine similar experiences in other societies; to conduct extensive public consultations on the issue; and "to formulate recommendations to the government to ensure that accommodation practices conform to the values of Québec society as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society" (Government of Quebec, 2008: 7).

Co-chaired by a sociologist, Gerard Bouchard, and a liberal philosopher, Charles Taylor, the commission travelled throughout Quebec through the fall of 2007, garnering submissions on the question of **reasonable accommodation**, *defined as a form of arrangement or relaxation aimed at ensuring respect for the right of equality ... which, following the strict application of an institutional standard, infringes on an individual's right to equality* (Government of Quebec, 2008: 7) of minority cultural and religious rights. In the end, the commission made 37 recommendations based on the notion not of multiculturalism but of "***interculturalisme***," what Saul (2008: 147) describes as "the intercultural dovetailing relationship among four groups: the francophone majority, the anglophone minority, the Aboriginal minority, and *the cultural communities*, that is, the newcomers, with French as the central convening language of all four."

Among the commission's specific recommendations were greater cultural awareness, improved intercultural relations, better integration of migrants, and greater effort on the part of government and its institutions to deal with racism and inequality. Its broadest thrust, however, was to recommend Quebec's adoption of **open secularism** based on four principles: (1) the moral equality of persons; (2) freedom of conscience and religion; (3) separation of church and state; and (4) the state's neutrality with respect to religions and deep-seated secular convictions (Government of Quebec, 2008: 45).

Quebec's anxieties, fears, and successes in accommodating cultural difference have their mirror in the rest of Canada. This is ironic, for Canada's mirror is in fact larger, embracing Quebec itself. Quebec's struggles to incorporate minority cultural differences within a framework of civic nationalism are a subset of Canada's struggle as a whole to fashion a coherent national community that embraces three nations—the English, the French, and the Aboriginal—and an assortment of other ethnic groups (Saul, 1997, 2008).

THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION TODAY

How strong is the appeal of Quebec sovereignty today? Data conducted since 1995 are consistent on four points (Trent, 1995; *Edmonton Journal*, 1999b, 2000b; Johnson, 1999; Macpherson, 2000; Dubuc, 2001). First, the vast majority of Quebecers—as many as 80 percent in one poll—oppose holding another referendum. Second, few Quebecers believe a referendum on sovereignty would pass if held today. Third, support for sovereignty during "normal" periods averages about 42 percent (Leger Marketing, 2008). Support for sovereignty rises above this only when Quebec feels attacked or rejected by English Canada, as during the Meech Lake crisis or in late 2008 when Bloc Québécois support for a Liberal-New Democrat coalition to defeat the minority Conservative government led to anger directed at Quebecers at large (see Chapter 9), or when the idea of sovereignty is presented in the abstract or its definition unclear. Fourth, a large number of Quebecers hold the apparently contradictory belief that Quebec and Canada have reached an impasse *and* that federalism can be renewed.

Looked at another way, about a third of Quebecers are consistent federalists. Another third are hard-core *indépendantistes*

who identify with the Quebec state. The remaining third of Quebecers are torn between choosing the Quebec nation or the country of Canada, a predicament captured in the oft-quoted joke of Quebec comedian Yvon Deschamps that "All we want is an independent Quebec within a strong and united Canada" (Colombo, 1994: 224). It is on this third of Quebecers that the outcome of any future sovereignty referendum would hinge, should such a vote be held.

At the same time, most analysts agree that compared with the 1960s and 1970s, sovereignty today invokes little passion in Quebec. Why is this the case? In part, the reason is that most of the political, economic, and cultural grievances expressed during the Quiet Revolution have been addressed (Ignatieff, 1993).

In consequence of this fact, both the Bloc Québécois and Parti Québécois have soft-pedalled independence instead of more provincial autonomy in specific areas.

Politically, francophones since the 1960s have used their strength in Quebec particularly to make gains within Canada's political and labour sectors (Nakhaie, 1997). (Between 1968 and 2008, three of eight Canadian prime ministers held ridings in Quebec, while a fourth—Paul Martin Jr.—had strong Franco-Ontario roots.) By contrast, while those of British background continue disproportionately to dominate elite positions within Canada, they do not do so unopposed; indeed, it can be argued that British Canada as a sociological construct no longer exists (Gwyn, 1996; Igartua, 2006). The object of francophone Canada's wrath—White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) Canada—is today largely a historical artifact.

Economically, French-Canadians in general, and francophone Quebecers in particular, no longer experience the second-place status relative to English-Canadians once identified by Porter (1965) and the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963).

Table 5.1
Median Earnings, 2005 Constant Dollars, Full-Time Earners, Canada, Provinces, and Territories, 1980–2005

1980	1990	2000	2005	% Canadian 1980(1) Median	% Canadian Median 2005(1)	% 1980–2005(1)	+/–
Canada	41,348	40,778	40,443	41,401	—	—	0.1
Nfld. and Lab.	37,510	38,153	36,079	37,429	90.7	90.4	0.3
PEI	32,405	33,441	33,561	34,140	78.4	82.5	4.1
NS	36,532	38,237	36,165	36,917	88.4	89.2	.8
NB	36,436	36,848	34,763	35,288	88.1	85.2	2.9
Que.	39,938	38,325	37,836	37,722	96.6	91.1	5.5
Ont.	41,395	42,354	44,440	44,748	100.1	108.1	8.1
Man.	37,247	36,564	35,425	36,692	90.1	88.6	1.5
Sask.	38,804	34,082	33,785	35,948	93.8	86.8	7.0
Alta.	43,732	40,711	40,782	43,964	105.8	106.2	0.4
B.C.	47,605	42,173	43,715	42,230	115.1	102.0	13.1
Yukon	52,942	49,410	47,611	49,787	126.6	120.3	6.3
NWT(2)	50,353	54,759	56,122	60,119	121.8	145.2	23.4
Nun.(2)	46,140	49,701	50,542	58,088	111.6	140.3	28.7

Notes: (1) Percentages and percentage change calculated by authors.
(2) The territory of Nunavut was created in 1999. Data for Nunavut and the Northwest Territories for 1980 and 1990 have been adjusted to reflect the new boundaries.
Source: Statistics Canada. 2008. "Earnings and incomes of Canadians over the past quarter century, 2006 census," 14. Cat. # 97-563-x. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?lang=eng&catno=97-563-X2006001.

In 2005, the average nominal wage in Quebec was $32,074 compared to the Canadian average of $35,498, or about 90 percent (Statistics Canada, 2006b). As shown in Table 5.1, the median income in Quebec (constant dollars) for the same year was $37,722, only 91 percent of the Canadian median income and down in terms of percentage from 1980.

Today, much of Quebec's bourgeoisie is francophone and, like the Canadian bourgeoisie at large, wedded to breaking down rather than defending national borders. Moreover, among workers, those of French ethnicity (in Canada as a whole) actually earned significantly more than workers of British ethnicity in 1991 (Lian and Matthews, 1998).

Clearly, there remains considerable inequality in Canada in terms of both income and wealth; indeed, the gap between rich and poor has increased in recent decades (see Chapter 9). Education and occupation are key factors in inequality, but opportunities and outcomes in both these areas are in turn highly correlated with several other demographic factors. Among these factors are racial and ethnic discrimination (Fleras and Elliott, 2007), especially with regard to Aboriginal ancestry (see Chapter 13), as well as gender, marital status, region of residence, and age. Income and poverty rates are particularly high for single-parent female-headed families and single, widowed, or divorced female seniors (Morissette and Zhang, 2001). Recent immigrants also have lower earnings, even when education is controlled, than long-term immigrants or Canadian-born individuals (Statistics Canada, 2003).

Quebec's success in stemming the cultural threat is harder to measure. Though the percentage of French-speaking people in Quebec has stabilized at roughly 80 percent (see Chapter 4), many francophone Quebecers remain "linguistically insecure" (Thompson, 1995: 78). They fear particularly the impact of allophone immigrants to Quebec who might choose English rather than French as their adopted language, a fear that ties into concerns about cultural differences generally as discussed above. Still, the level of insecurity concerning language is lower among younger Quebecers, who are used to the protections provided by Quebec's language laws. Moreover, recent census figures suggest that in fact allophone immigrants are today actually strengthening the French language in Quebec by opting to adopt that language (*Globe and Mail*, 2002), an outcome likely the result of powers obtained by the provincial government over immigration that allow for the recruitment of immigrants from francophone countries.

Beyond Quebec, the world has also changed dramatically since the time of the Quiet Revolution. Liberation politics, drawn from Third World experiences and the writings of Franz Fanon and Che Guevara, have little appeal today. Few Quebecers today, especially young people, see their province as a colony. In this time of increased global connectedness, as the world seems drawn closer and closer together by economics, technology, cultural exchanges, and trade deals, the very notion of sovereignty seems unclear. (What does independence mean? What would Quebec gain through sovereignty that it does not already possess?) Meanwhile, recent examples of ethnic nationalism gone wrong (in Yugoslavia, for example) provide stinging counterpoints to the ideal of independence. (What would an independent Quebec lose?) Finally, many young Quebecers increasingly see themselves—not unlike young people elsewhere—as individual consumers and mobile workers. A CROP/Environics poll conducted in the fall of 2002 found that 63 percent of Quebecers aged 18–44 identify with neither federalism *nor* sovereignty (*Edmonton Journal*, 2002).

For two centuries English-speaking Canada has believed that Quebec

nationalism would disappear. Federalist politicians have fuelled these beliefs for the past 30 years, often after yet another crisis has shaken the Canadian federation, yet Quebec nationalism and the idea of an independent homeland continue to stir within Quebec. Why is this the case? The answer lies in the fact that the issue of French-English, Quebec-Canada relations within the country cannot be addressed solely by material or even constitutional changes alone. The basis of the issue lies in such intangible, but immanently sociological, issues as self-identity, mutual respect, and the need for recognition.

SOCIETY, NATION, MODERNITY, AND "SELF"

Who are you? That is, what are the elements that shape who you are and speak to you and others of your "self"? This is a distinctly sociological question, one that emerged in the 19th century with modernity. Riesman et al. (1950) note, for example, that notions of individual identity make little sense in pre-modern, feudal societies, where ideas, norms, behaviours, expectations, and outcomes are fairly rigidly controlled by tradition. In the Middle Ages, to use the popular phrase of the 1960s, no one would have sought to "find himself or herself." People of that era were told directly and indirectly who they were from the time they were born. By contrast, in modern societies, individuals not only *seem* to be freer of social restraints, they are also expected to find and express their particular uniqueness.

What are the building blocks used in this construction? For Marx, writing in the mid-19th century, class was the primary factor in a person's identity kit; for Durkheim, occupation was central. For feminist scholars today, gender is a chief source of one's identity as well as one's world view, but other factors, such as religion, ethnicity, or education may also provide salient materials informing an individual's self-identity. For people growing up in modern societies, the cache of materials from which to make a "self" is seemingly endless, drawn from television, the Internet, magazines, and so on.

Sociologists view this construction critically, however. First, individual and collective identities are mutually constructed. In a real sense, no one simply chooses an individual identity. Rather, an identity arises out of membership in a group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Second, both individual and collective identities are highly malleable (Cook, 1995: 235). The importance of an identity may lessen over time for a person or group, or events may lead an individual or group to rediscover and reassert their roots. Third, individual identities are neither singular nor exclusive. A person may simultaneously see himself or herself as Italian, a doctor, a soccer player, a conservative, and gay or lesbian.

What does the issue of individual and collective identity have to do with Quebec and Canada? Simply this: Quebec's national culture, broadly conceived, provides many Quebecers with essential materials for their personal identities. Writing in 1951, André Laurendeau (1985) noted that: "Except for the stateless (and even then!) every being carries the mark of a particular culture. The richer it is, the more it nourishes him [*sic*]."

This notion is at odds (at least on the surface) with dominant Western culture, where private and public spheres are viewed as separate, the individual is sacrosanct, and "the state and civil society are typically understood as facing off against each other" (White, 1997: 22). Pierre Trudeau's denunciations of Quebec nationalism as tribal (Chapter 4) were rooted in a supposed separation of individual self and society (Couture, 1998), hence his desire to entrench the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1982 Constitution as a means of protecting individuals from collective oppression.

Separating the spheres is difficult, if not impossible, however. Note, for example, that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms deals with both individual and collective rights (Cook, 1995: 234). Likewise, the policies of official bilingualism and multiculturalism enacted by Trudeau similarly protect collective rights over language and culture (Webber, 1994; Couture, 1998).

It is therefore inaccurate to argue that a necessary opposition exists between the rights of collectives and those of individuals, represented by Quebec and English-speaking Canada, respectively. Repeated surveys show Quebecers have at least as much deep regard for individual rights as other Canadians. Indeed, Quebecers are generally quite liberal in their acceptance of individual differences (Denis, 1993). At the same time, English-speaking Canadians also possess a sense of collective identity, albeit understated, as evidenced quickly if someone tells them they are "just like" Americans.

If the sociological (and political) problem between Quebec and Canada does not lie in an opposition between individual and collective rights, it lies even less in an absolute separation of the French and English cultures. French and English identities (and others) in Canada include elements of each other (Dufour, 1990; Webber, 1994; Saul, 1997). Notes Dufour (1990: 81): "Almost by definition, the Quebec identity comprises a more or less significant, more or less conscious, Canadian component." And again: "English is a deeply ambivalent and perturbing element of the Quebec identity" (1990: 97). A majority of Quebecers (though less among francophones) still see themselves simultaneously as Quebecers *and* as Canadians (see Smith, 1998), though the former generally takes precedence in their identity structures.

What, then, underlies the conflict? Simply that *the right of Quebecers to possess a distinct identity be recognized and respected by the rest of Canada* (Taylor, 1993; Coulombe, 1998).

There is an apparent paradox in this demand for, as Taylor (1993) and Ignatieff (1993) note, Canada and Quebec have never been closer. Quebec was "more distinct" before the Quiet Revolution than it is today. Throughout Canada, regional differences on social factors and values have been lessening for decades (see Goyder, 1993; Baer et al., 1993), a product of modernization. The paradox of diminishing differences and escalating demands for recognition is partly explained, however, if we consider globalization's impact upon states and nations (see Chapter 1).

On the one hand, globalization has accelerated the process of homogenizing cultures. On the other hand, it has left many national groups feeling uneasy and compelled to overemphasize and protect remaining distinctions. The weakened capacity of states, especially multinational states such as Canada, to protect them, has further pressed national cultures to seek shelter in smaller units. In line with Bell's (1993: 362) contention that national states today are both too big and too small to deal with important issues, supporters of sovereignty argue that an independent Quebec would be better able to adapt to the demands of the global marketplace (see Bourgault, 1991; Parti Québécois, 1994).

Such claims are debatable but ultimately beside the point. The question is: Is it possible for English-speaking Canada to acknowledge Quebec's distinctiveness in a meaningful way; to grant recognition and respect for Québécois identity; and to give Quebec sufficient powers for its survival within Canada's existing state structures (see Taylor 1993; Denis, 1993; Coulombe, 1998)? Or does the flow of history lead inexorably to Quebec sovereignty?

THE RETURN OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Suddenly, in the fall of 2006, Canada caught up with its history and, one might argue, with sociology. In an act

unimaginable only a few years before, on November 27, 2006, the Canadian House of Commons passed the following motion (by a vote of 266 to 16, the rest abstaining or absent): "That this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada."

How did this turn come about? And, to what extent, does it represent a "turn" in French-English relations? To unpack the meaning of the Common's resolution, we need to briefly return to previous discussions.

We have seen how, depending on the time and place, since 1763 Canada's dominant anglophone elite have employed various policies (from coercion and subjugation, to isolation, and subtle assimilation, to tentative efforts beginning in the 1960s at accommodation and recognition) of dealing with the smaller, but nonetheless significant and distinct francophone minority. The prevailing issue underlying these policies is that of the nation.

Chapter 1 noted the conflation of nation, state, country, and society. Canada is a textbook case of this conflation in practice. The "problem" with which Canada has struggled since its founding is in every sense a modern one: Can it survive as a country administered by a state that accommodates several nations within its territory? As noted in Chapter 2, Lord Durham's Eurocentric background led him to conclude that every nation must have a state, and that no state must have more than one nation, a situation that led to the failed Act of Union of 1841, which led finally to Confederation.

The years after 1867 saw the French "fact" in Canada largely isolated (and thus strengthened) within Quebec, while the rest of Canada took on a decidedly English stamp. By the 1960s, arguments about the nature of Canada focused on whether it was a confederation of 10 provinces (of which Quebec was merely one) or a marriage of "two nations," with separatists in Quebec arguing for a third option: that the marriage be dissolved (Chapter 3).

The constitutional discussions of the 1970s and 1980s failed to resolve Quebec's place within Canada. Subsequent efforts to revise the constitution also failed and even heightened the crisis. English-speaking Canada's rejection in 1990 of the Meech Lake Accord, based primarily on the Accord's recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society," increased many Quebecers' sense that they were not accepted by the rest of Canada; the result was a rise in support for sovereignty and the nearly successful vote for separation in 1995 (Chapter 4).

Fast-forward to the fall of 2006. Earlier that same year, the governing Liberal Party was defeated in a federal election by the Stephen Harper-led Conservative Party, a party rebuilt from the ruins of the former Progressive Conservative Party and Reform-Alliance parties). In the course of the subsequent race to replace Paul Martin as Liberal leader, one of the contenders, Michael Ignatieff (see Chapter 9), suggested that Quebec be recognized as a "nation" in the Constitution. Though endorsed by the federal party's Quebec wing, the other Liberal candidates and much of English-Canada's media quickly denounced Ignatieff's proposal, which went against not only the Trudeau legacy of opposing Quebec nationalism in favour of a dual, pan-Canadian, but went further than any previous constitutional effort, including the failed Meech Lake Accord, in recognizing Quebec's distinctiveness (Fidler, 2006).

Sensing an opportunity to divide the Liberal Party, however, the Bloc Québécois, which had elected 51 members in the 2006 election, proposed a parliamentary motion along the lines of Ignatieff's position, that Quebec constituted a nation within Canada. Likewise, sensing the chance to build support in Quebec while blunting the Bloc Québécois motion,

Prime Minister Stephen Harper proposed the motion (above) that the House of Commons subsequently adopted.

At first glance, the proposal appears to be a major step in recognizing Quebec's distinct identity, something that the Reform Party, of which Harper was a prominent member, had vehemently opposed two decades earlier.

Fidler (2006), however, argues that:

> [T]he original Bloc motion, which had identified the "Québécois" as a nation, referred to them in English as "Quebeckers." That is, a territorial concept, encompassing everyone who inhabits Quebec irrespective of first language or ethnic origin. This is now the common definition of "Québécois" in Quebec. [Prime Minister] Harper's motion, in contrast, used the term "Québécois" in both French and English versions, an ethnic connotation implying that only those whose first language is French qualified as a "nation."

In short, the House of Commons motion recognized an ethnic definition of the nation, while the Bloc version recognized a civic definition of the nation tied to territory (see Chapter 1).

Mere semantics? Perhaps. Linguistic meanings are slippery at the best of times, especially when moving between two languages. Nonetheless, Fidler raises important questions about the exact meaning of the House of Commons resolution. Quoting journalist Pierre Dubuc, Fidler argues that recognition of the Québécois nation is designed to prepare for the partition of Quebec should that province ever vote *Yes* to a referendum on sovereignty. That is, while the Québécois (francophone) nation might vote to separate, likewise the English-speaking areas could also vote to remain in Canada. Such a stance would be commensurate with that of previous Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative.

But Fidler (2006) also notes something further, the phrase "a nation within a united Canada":

> One would think that if the "Québécois" are a nation within Canada, then surely they are a nation without Canada. Ah, but there's the rub. Whoever says "nation" says ... self-determination. The right of nations to self-determination has long been a fundamental concept of international law and diplomacy.

In short, the resolution passed by the House of Commons appears to thwart the Bloc Quebecois' motion by giving symbolic (but not constitutional) recognition to the Quebecois nation, while simultaneously denying the territorial nationhood of Quebec with all its political implications. Likewise, while the Bloc version would have given particular power to the provincial state as representing and perhaps even constituting the Quebec nation and society, the House of Commons version reserved considerable political power for the Canadian state in this regard. Ultimately, was the House of Commons motion of 2006 too clever by half? Does it offer Quebecers the appearance of recognition, but provide something much less? Does it in consequence represent another failed opportunity to recognize Quebec's specific identity and needs?

How do Canadian people view Canada's "nations," not merely that of Quebec, but otherwise? A poll of 1,500 Canadians, conducted by Leger Marketing for the Association of Canadian Studies shortly before the vote on the House of Commons motion, found that 93 percent of those polled, both anglophone and francophone, agreed that Canada is a nation. When asked, however, if Quebecers are also a nation,

only 38 percent of anglophone Canadians agreed compared with 78 percent of francophone Canadians. The results suggest that anglophones are more likely to recognize ethnic definitions of nationhood while francophones hold a more territorial or civic definition of nationhood. Moreover, while francophone Quebecers overwhelmingly believed that they constitute a nation, they also supported recognition of Aboriginal peoples and Acadians as nations (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2
Percent of Anglophone and Francophone Respondents Viewing Various Groups as Nations within Canada, 2006

Group	Anglophones	Francophones
Aboriginal peoples	61%	79%
Métis	46%	59%
Acadians	37%	74%
Quebecers	38%	78%

Source: Adapted from Jack Jedwab, The Association for Canadian Studies, available at: http://www.acs-aec.ca/oldsite/CurrentEvent/Face%20the%20Nations%20_2_.pdf.

A more recent survey suggests these different views have not changed. An online survey of 2,505 adults (including 932 Quebecers) conducted by Ipsos Reid in the summer of 2008, amid the celebrations of the founding of Quebec City in 1608, found that 70 percent of Quebecers view themselves as "a nation within a united Canada," while only 36 percent in the rest of Canada agree. Likewise, half of Quebecers subscribe to the "two nations" concept of Canada, compared with only one-third in the rest of Canada. Instead, more than 40 percent of those outside Quebec see Canada as "a nation with one dominant culture and several equal minorities," a view held by only 20 percent of Quebecers (figures in the *Edmonton Journal*, 2008).

In short, Canada's French and English communities continue to view each other from quite different promontories.

QUEBEC "SOLUTIONS"—AND CANADA'S PROBLEM

In the aftermath of the events of 1995, the federalist forces led by Jean Chrétien's Liberal government adopted two strategies to counter Quebec sovereignty's appeal. These strategies were referred to as "Plan A" and "Plan B" or, as Conway (1997: 227) describes them, the carrot and the stick.

Plan A involved attempts to show Quebecers that Confederation works and perhaps, in time, to win Quebecers' hearts and minds. At the symbolic level, the House of Commons passed a motion one month after the referendum that recognized Quebec as a distinct society (Balthazar, 1997: 59). This was followed two years later by the premiers' Calgary Unity Declaration acknowledging the "unique character of Quebec society." At the more practical level, the federal government transferred administrative powers over immigration to Quebec (one of the Meech Lake Accord's five demands); launched a series of programs, especially in higher education; promoted a national, private French television network, and expanded French usage online. Finally, as in the past, the federal government enticed federalist Quebecers such as Stéphane Dion and Pierre Pettigrew to Ottawa.

By contrast, Plan B involved a "tough love" approach to Quebec (Conway, 1997; Balthazar, 1997). Politically, the centrepiece of Plan B is Bill C-20 (the Clarity Act). Passed by the House of Commons in March 2000, the Clarity Act

allows federal MPs to vote on both the clarity of the wording of any referendum question on sovereignty introduced by the Quebec National Assembly and the clarity of any victory in a referendum before beginning negotiations on Quebec sovereignty. In short, the Clarity Act renders a vote in favour of sovereignty in any future referendum null until debated and passed by the House of Commons. Quebec nationalists, and sovereigntists in particular, view the Clarity Act as an infringement on Quebecers' rights to self-determination and the jurisdiction of Quebec's National Assembly. The Clarity Act further suggests that Quebec's boundaries would be up for negotiation if Quebecers ever vote *yes* to sovereignty (*Edmonton Journal*, 2000a), something that Fiddler (2006) argues is repeated in the House of Commons' "nation" motion of 2006. For many Quebecers, in general, Plan B repeats an all-too-familiar pattern of trying to coerce French Canada into accepting the rules of Confederation.

Even before the sovereignty vote, however, a third strategy, Plan C, was already being proposed in several quarters. Less mentioned than either Plan A or Plan B, this strategy had as its aim a radical **decentralization** of Canada whereby Quebec's demands would be applied throughout the federation; that is, whatever powers Quebec obtained would be automatically given to every other province. In the words of Gordon Gibson (1994), a former Liberal and Social Credit politician and conservative policy adviser, Plan C would see Ottawa reduced to a "service centre," a relatively powerless clearing house for functions residual to those of the provinces.

The idea of decentralization (or devolution) has been around for a long time and appeals to several distinct constituencies albeit for different reasons. To rigid formalists, decentralization meets Quebec's demands while also maintaining a strict equality of the provinces. To provincial rights advocates, especially in western Canada, decentralization means a return to the division of powers written into the 1867 Constitution, before the Great Depression and two world wars meant the growth of federal powers. To political leaderships in the "have" provinces, it means more money and power that need not be shared with other jurisdictions. To pro-business think tanks (such as the Fraser Institute) and corporations (and their lobbyists, such as the Canadian Council of Chief Executives), decentralization means dealing with only one level of government—smaller and more compliant—regarding, for example, environmental and labour regulations. To some mainstream economists, decentralization embraces the principle of **subsidiarity** *that unless there is a valid reason to the contrary, state functions should be exercized by the lowest level of government* (Courchene, 1997). Finally, in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some viewed decentralization as an inevitable and perhaps even positive adaptation to globalization (Courchene, 1998; Resnick, 2000; Ibbitson, 2001) that might ultimately strengthen Canadian federalism through greater co-operation.

Decentralization also has critics, however. First, it is argued, Canada is already the world's most decentralized federation (Valaskakis and Fournier, 1995), a situation that slows responses to crises. Second, most Canadians still believe in a strong role for the federal government, particularly in areas of health and social policy. Further decentralization would result in large corporate interests playing regions and provinces off against each other, endangering national standards and programs, such as medicare (Laxer and Harrison, 1995). Third, the federal government provides one of the few "checks and balances" to provincial power, and vice versa (see Taylor, 1993), an equilibrium that decentralization would alter (Romanow, 2006). Fourth, as more power flowed to the provinces, people's identification with

Canada as a whole would lessen, threatening national unity.

Many of these same critics offer a different solution: **asymmetrical federalism** (Laxer, 1992; Taylor, 1993). Asymmetrical federalism begins from the premise that Quebec is not like the other provinces, that the needs of both Quebec and the other provinces are different, and that federalism cannot be practised in the manner of treating all provinces the same.

How would asymmetrical federalism work? Laxer (1992, 2001) and Webber (1994: 230) suggest that Quebec be given constitutional powers over areas it views as necessary for preserving its national identity, while these same powers for Canadians elsewhere remain "housed" in Ottawa. In effect, Quebec would have more powers than the other provinces, but it would not have powers over the citizens of other provinces, nor would Quebecers have more powers than other Canadians. The change would require two sittings of the House of Commons: an all-Canada sitting, in which Quebec MPs would participate, and a separate sitting in which Quebec MPs would not participate, dealing with those areas delegated to the Quebec provincial government (see also Resnick, 1991).

In a more complex development of this argument, Resnick (2000) suggests Canada be reconfigured as a country with three tiers that include six provinces (the four Atlantic provinces, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan); three region-provinces (Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia) with large populations and significant resources; and one nation-province (Quebec). These changes could be combined with other political reforms, such as reform or abolition of the Senate, fixed electoral dates, and the replacement of Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system with proportional representation (Resnick, 2000; Conway, 1997: 245).

Asymmetrical federalism also has its critics, however (see Cook, 1995: 242–245; also Valaskakis and Fournier, 1995). First, such a change is politically unacceptable to the other provinces and most Canadians, as attested by English-speaking Canada's response to the Meech Lake Accord, which, in effect, had attempted to "codify" the existing practice of asymmetry (Gregg, 2005: 53). Second, Canadian federalism is already asymmetrical in certain respects. Like decentralization, further asymmetry would weaken Canada's federal principle as other provinces quickly sought the same powers. Third, by making the government in Quebec City more important to Quebecers, an action not wholly endorsed by many Quebecers themselves (*Edmonton Journal*, 2000b), the path could be set for further separatist agitation in that province.

Whether asymmetrical federalism could work is debatable. In any case, its program has little support outside of the academic community. By contrast, as noted, Plan C—decentralization—is supported by a number of powerful constituencies. In consequence, some observers suggest after 1995, Canada embarked on a steady, slow, and largely invisible course of decentralization (see Gregg, 2005; Griffiths, 2008). Plans A and B got all the press, but Plan C had the greatest impact.

Gregg (2005) identifies decentralization's start with the 1995 federal budget. Canada was then dealing with a growing national debt. Canada's then Liberal finance minister, Paul Martin, made deep cuts to the federal budget to deal with the problem. The cuts were particularly deep to shared-cost welfare-state programs (see Chapter 8). In effect, the federal government opted out of its share of paying for national programs it had been instrumental in founding. But those who pay the piper get to call the tune; in consequence, the provinces demanded more control over these programs. The province of Quebec saw the opportunity, suggests Gregg, to enlist the other provinces to join in calls for greater autonomy. (Gregg notes that the

Calgary Unity Declaration in 1997 stated: "If any future constitutional amendment confers powers on one province, these powers must be available to all provinces.") The provincial premiers' demands also coincided with the impact of the free trade agreement (implemented in 1989) upon economic relations, which shifted traditional east-west exchanges with north-south exchanges, thus making the provinces less interdependent (see Courchene, 1998; see also Chapter 9). The effect of these changes was that, while the federal government over the next decade succeeded in eliminating its fiscal deficits and paying off much of the national debt, control over programs was increasingly delegated to the provinces. Decentralization, whether planned or not, became a *fait accompli*.

For critics of decentralization, the insistence of dealing with the "Quebec problem" through a rigid adherence to symmetrical powers poses the risk that Canada will not end with a bang—the cataclysmic result of Quebec's separation—but with a whimper; with the slow dismantlement of Canada into a number of incoherent fiefdoms. In the words of former Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow, "the soil has been tilled for the sprouting of views at odds with shared destiny, and today there is a palpable momentum toward decentralization, individualism, and privatization, all peddled as a means to forge a stronger nation" (Romanow, 2006: 50).

Yet, one does not exclude the other. The dissolution of all does not render impossible the separation of one. What if Quebec were to separate? What would it mean for Quebec and for the rest of Canada?

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: SEPARATION

Countries, states, nations, and societies change. Though Canada's dissolution would astound and dismay much of the world—as Ignatieff (1993: 147) remarks, "If federalism can't work in my Canada, it probably can't work anywhere"—no country is ordained to last forever.

What would Canada and Quebec look like if they separated? In descriptive terms, Canada would cover 8.4 million square kilometres, nearly 85 percent of its previous size, though the Atlantic provinces would be separated from Ontario (Young, 1995: 9; Scowen, 1999), and have a population of more than 25.3 million, roughly 50 percent of which would be located in Ontario. Quebec would cover 1.5 million square kilometres and have a population of about 7.7 million people (see Table 1.1 for these figures). The economies of both Canada and Quebec would still be large. For Canada, *sans* Quebec, in 2007 real (constant 2002 dollars) **gross domestic product** (GDP)—*the total value of all goods and services produced by a country in a year*—was $1.053 trillion, while that of Quebec was nearly $266 billion (Statistics Canada, 2007b). Indeed, Quebec today ranks among the world's 30 leading economies (Ramonet, 2001). These figures, however, assume no massive transfers of land either way, no large movements of population, and no disruptions to either economy resulting from political unrest. These are big assumptions.

Setting aside the real possibility of violence (see Gibson, 1994; Monahan, 1995; Martin, 1999), with which authorities would have to deal, several key issues would need to be addressed immediately and involve likely bitter negotiations. These issues would include territorial boundaries (Reid, 1992: 37–66); division of public assets and the national debt, which was $508 billion as of March 31, 2007 (Statistics Canada, 2007b; see also Valaskakis and Fournier, 1995; Scowen, 1999); and determination of citizenship (Bourgault, 1991; Scowen, 1999). A further key issue would be jurisdiction over and responsibility for Aboriginal peoples (Bourgault, 1991; Parti Québécois, 1994; Gibson, 1994; Conway,

1997; Scowen, 1999). These issues would only scratch the surface, however. Deeper questions would remain for the citizens of both new countries.

Canada and Quebec would both require new constitutions. Quebec could achieve this task more easily than Canada (Parti Québécois, 1994). By contrast, constitutional renewal in Canada would require far more actors and a fundamental rethinking of the country's purpose and structure.

Both countries also would have to refashion their international relations. Quebec's task in this case would likely be more difficult than Canada's, though Quebec sovereigntists assume that international recognition, a seat at the United Nations, and partnership in all agreements previously signed by Canada would be automatically forthcoming (Bourgault, 1991; Turp, 1993; Parti Québécois, 1994). Finally, both Canada and Quebec would need to consider their changed relationship with the United States.

By far, however, the most wrenching adjustment for people in both countries would be psychological. Only a minority of people within Quebec desire outright independence; most hold strong feelings of attachment for Canada. Outside of Quebec, while there is an element of anti-French, anti-Quebec sentiment, and in recent years a hefty dose of fatigue with separatist threats leading to some remarking that it is time to "say goodbye" (Scowen, 1999; see also Brimelow, 1986; and Bercuson and Cooper, 1991), the vast majority of Canadians want Quebec to remain within Canada. A breakup would be difficult for both communities, though likely more so for English-speaking Canada. While Quebecers have had longer to prepare for the event and to define themselves as Québécois, English-speaking Canadians have not prepared themselves for such an eventuality. Their sense of identity includes Quebec, even if many refuse to acknowledge this. Quebec remains at the heart of most Canadians' psychological map of their country (as noted in Chapter 3).

QUEBEC AND THE "OTHER" ANGLOPHONE STATE

Bourgault (1991: 24) notes: "In Quebec, pro-American feeling is probably stronger than in the rest of Canada." At first, this may seem curious given the virulent antipathy between New France and the New England states in the years prior to the American Revolution (Chapter 2). After this time, however, Quebec's contacts with the United States gradually became more positive. The American Revolution's ideals appealed to Quebec's intellectual class and fuelled the rebellions of 1837–1838 (Conway, 1997). From Louis Papineau to Louis Riel, French-Canadian "rebels" repeatedly sought safe haven across the border. Nor were they alone. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, francophone emigrants, too, chose the eastern United States over the Canadian West.

Meanwhile, American capital also streamed into the province, stimulating Quebec's industrialization (Chodos and Hamovitch, 1991). The fact Prime Minister Brian Mulroney grew up in a Quebec town built by American investment and was president of an American branch plant before entering politics (Sawatsky, 1991) is symbolically significant.

The rise of English nationalism in the 1960s (Chapter 8) in counterpoint to Quebec nationalism further pushed (unwittingly) many Quebecers into the American embrace. Anglo-Canadian desires for a strong central government found little support among Quebecers, who viewed the concept of One Canada and the federal state with suspicion. Closer economic links with the United States were furthered by economic development after the Quiet Revolution, especially the expansion of hydroelectric power during the 1970s, and by the sovereigntist argument that less dependence

upon Canada enhanced the separatist project. Thus was premised in part Quebec's support of the Free Trade Agreement in the 1988 federal election, or so thought some of English-speaking Canada's nationalists (see Resnick and Latouche, 1990).

Like people everywhere, Quebecers are large consumers of American culture. Likewise, many Quebecers, including many of its elite, also spend considerable time in the U.S., especially Florida (Cook, 1995: 229). For them, visits to the rest of Canada hold little attraction, though this sometimes changes when Quebecers do venture into the other provinces.

Quebec's unconscious relationship with the United States raises interesting questions. As André Laurendeau (1985) argued, "the homogenizing influence of the United States put in question the very existence of both Canadian [French and English] cultures." Unlike English-speaking Canadians, few Quebecers seem concerned about this influence. Some have argued, however, that Quebec's distinct culture has survived against American influence precisely because of its protected place within Canadian Confederation (Dufour, 1990; Resnick, 1991; Valaskakis and Fournier, 1995). More recently, Brunelle (1999) and Ramonet (2001) have further suggested that the sovereignty question has distracted Quebecers from examining the impact of neo-liberal globalization and Americanization upon Quebec society, and the problems it might face after separation. (One interesting sidelight to the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was the sudden rise of anti-American sentiment in Quebec, which, of all Canadian provinces, most opposed the war.)

Interestingly, many of the same arguments can also be made regarding English-speaking Canada: that it has insufficiently valued the role of the French language and culture in differentiating Canada from the United States. Could either Quebec or Canada alone long withstand the assimilating influences of the American giant? This question and others are addressed in Part 2.

CONCLUSION

Canada and Quebec have travelled a long way since 1960, let alone since 1763. Sometimes in conflict more often than in co-operation, each has shaped the other. Canada's institutions, its decentralized system of governance, its tolerance of cultural differences (not to be overstated), and much of its identity are built upon French foundations. For its part, Quebec—the territory in which the French "fact" was suppressed and contained, and therefore incubated—also contains a hidden English element. Together, Canada's French and English "nations" have withstood absorption into the United States and built, by nearly any standard, one of the best societies on earth.

Canada, it is often said, is an experiment (Bernard, 1996; Conway, 1997; Saul, 1997). Is it possible to break the European model of nation *equals* state *equals* country *equals* society? Is it possible to conceive and create a state structure in which two nations—three, counting the Aboriginal peoples—exist harmoniously and prosper, housed within a single country? A society in which majority, minority, and individual differences are embraced and respected, and yet political and social coherence are maintained? I leave the last words to Conway (1997: 252):

> If we can continue our unique experiment in seeking unity through diversity, if we can retain the two great cultures [French and English] together in one federal or confederal structure, Canada could yet become a model for all the world.... [I]f we fail, it will not be a disaster. Life will go on.... But the Canada we could have become ... will be lost, perhaps forever.

The world watches.

KEY TERMS

asymmetrical federalism
decentralization
gross domestic product (GDP)
interculturalisme
open secularism
reasonable accommodation
subsidiarity

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. Is secularism a kind of modern "religion"?
2. Is it possible to differentiate between individual and collective identities?
3. Why do anglophone and francophone Canadians hold such differing views about the meaning of "nation"?
4. Why do many francophone Quebecers view the United States, another anglophone country, more positively than English-speaking Canada?
5. Does globalization increase or decrease the likelihood of independence movements in Quebec and elsewhere in the world? Why?

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Courchene, Thomas. 1997. *The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges.* Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University.

One of Canada's best-known economists, Courchene outlines in this book some of the difficulties faced by states in the era of globalization.

Griffiths, Rudyard. 2008. *We're Prying French and English Canada Apart.* Ottawa: The Dominion Institute.

Written by the head of Canada's Dominion Institute, this book argues that recent federal initiatives are tearing apart the country's historic relationship between French and English.

Igartua, Jose E. 2006. *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945–1971.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

This book examines the enormous transformation that occurred in English-speaking Canada during Quebec's Quiet Revolution.

Ignatieff, Michael. 1993. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.* Toronto: Penguin.

Ignatieff's book examines several nationalist movements, including Quebec's.

Riesman, David, with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer. 1950. *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Don't let the year of publication put you off. This book remains a classic examination of individualism and the construction of personal identity in modern society.

RELATED WEBSITES

Bouchard-Taylor Commission Report
www.accommodements.qc.ca

In an effort to address perceived cultural and religious divisions, in February 2007 the Quebec government established the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, otherwise known as the Bouchard-Taylor Commission.

CBC Digital Archives (1995 Sovereignty Referendum)
http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/federal_politics/topics/1891/

A useful video clip dealing with the 1995 sovereignty referendum, *Separation Anxiety: The 1995 Quebec Referendum.*

Statistics Canada (Language Usage in Canada)
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-555/p13-eng.cfm

Derived from the 2006 census, Statistics Canada has a useful report on language usage in Canada, *The Evolving Linguistic Portrait of Canada.*