

CANADIAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

An Historical Sociological Approach • 2nd Edition

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NOUS SOMMES DES
DU GRIFFINTOWN
1- French
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CHAPTER 3

A HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDES

English and French, we climb by a double flight of stairs toward the destinies reserved for us on this continent, without knowing each other, without meeting each other, and without even seeing each other, except on the landing of politics.

—Pierre Joseph-Oliver Chauveau, first Quebec premier after Confederation, 1876

He shall hang though every dog in Quebec howl in his favour.

—Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald, refusing to pardon Riel, 1885

Society must take every means to prevent the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power.

—Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, at the peak of the FLQ Crisis, 1970

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1955, Canadians were transfixed by television pictures of hundreds of hockey fans rioting in the streets of Montreal to protest the suspension, for the rest of the regular season and playoffs, of Maurice "Rocket" Richard (1921–2000). Store windows were smashed, cars overturned, and property looted, leading to the arrest of 37 adults and four juveniles. The Richard riot ended only when Richard went on radio and television the next day to ask the rioters to stop.

We noted in Chapter 1 the importance of symbols to societies. In 1955, Quebec was on the verge of *"La Revolution Tranquil,"* the Quiet Revolution. In this context, the Richard riot had little to do with hockey. Richard, the first player in NHL history to score 50 goals in a regular season, was hero to a French-speaking population dominated by an anglophone minority. For francophones, Richard's suspension was symbolic of this unequal and discriminatory relationship. In turn, the riot was a symbolic protest against what many Quebecers viewed as 200 years of subjugation and humiliation. As we will see in this and subsequent chapters, however, symbols not only unite, they also divide. Indeed, much of French-English conflict in Canada can be viewed as a clash of symbols.

This chapter provides a necessarily short account of Quebec during the period between Confederation and the Second World War. It then provides a more detailed account of the events, individuals, and ideas that transformed Quebec, leading to the historic Quebec election of 1960 and the turbulent years of the Quiet Revolution, which ended with the October Crisis of 1970, a moment when, once more, English-speaking Canada watched transfixed by events on their television screens. Competing concepts of nationalism are discussed.

ENGLISH EXPANSION AND THE ISOLATION OF QUEBEC

Confederation in 1867 recognized Quebec as distinct, with its own majority French-Canadian population, Catholic religion, and civil law tradition, combined with autonomous political powers. For many French-Canadians, the historic province on the shores of the St. Lawrence was their homeland. At the same time, significant French-Canadian communities existed outside Quebec, especially in New Brunswick, but also in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, and the western territories (Silver, 1997). Confederation partially disentangled issues of Quebec's governance from those of the other, majority-English provinces. Confederation did not, however, separate French and Catholic sensibilities from the issue of how their compatriots were treated in the other provinces, indeed, from the issue of respect.

Some French Quebecers in 1867 no doubt viewed diaspora French as "dead ducks," to use Parti Québécois leader René Lévesque's expression of the 1970s. In their minds, only Quebec could provide security for French language and culture. Nonetheless, French-Canadians in general also viewed Canada as a bargain between French and English. Yes, Quebec for all practical purposes would always be the citadel of French culture in Canada, but the rights of French Catholics outside Quebec were also to be respected. By 1900, a broader understanding that "the two races" were not to be compartmentalized but rather forge a new nation had emerged within French Canada (Silver, 1997). Henri Bourassa (1868–1952), grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, was a chief spokesperson for this "pan-Canadian" view (Rioux, 1993).

Not all French-Canadians held this view; even less did English-Canadians. Alexander Muir's poem "The Maple Leaf Forever," written in the year of Confederation, says volumes about English Canada's view of the country just created:

> In days of yore, from Britain's shore,
> Wolfe the dauntless hero came,
> And planted firm Britannia's flag,
> On Canada's fair domain.

A hundred years of history had taught the English that the French could be neither defeated nor assimilated. However, the French could, it was believed, be contained. The French could have their separate language, religion, and civil laws, but only in Quebec. The rest of Canada would carry a distinctly British stamp.

These conflicting views of Confederation, and of the rights of minorities, inevitably met on the political landing. The rendezvous did not take long to occur. At Red River in the western territories in 1869, Canadian and American expansionism ran headlong into an established community of Métis (see chapters 7 and 10). Led by a young intellectual and visionary, Louis Riel (1844–1885), the Métis firmly rejected American efforts at annexation, but also demanded from the Canadian government full provincial status and protections for their French language and Catholic religion. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald (1815–1891) acceded to the demands. Thus, the Manitoba Act was passed in 1870, guaranteeing French-language rights in the legislature and schools and the right to a Catholic education in the new province of Manitoba.

The battle for French and Catholic rights outside Quebec was not over, however. The social conflicts and political intrigues of 1869 were repeated again in 1885, this time against the wider canvas of the entire western territories. This time, the demands of Riel and the Métis, not to mention the concerns of Natives and non-Natives, were rejected. The "rebels" were hunted down and tried. Louis Riel was hanged amid outcries from French-Canadian politicians and the Quebec press, who were convinced that he would not have been executed had he not been French and Catholic.

Riel's hanging was a blow to both French-Canadian and Métis hopes on the Prairies. For French Quebecers, Riel's hanging symbolized their exclusion from the rest of Canada. Incensed by Prime Minister Macdonald's refusal to pardon Riel (see quotation, above), French Quebec thereafter generally refused to vote Conservative, the two major exceptions being John Diefenbaker's landslide of 1958 and Brian Mulroney's equally massive electoral victories in 1984 and 1988 (appendices 1 and 2). More than ever, French Quebecers retreated behind their provincial walls, where the Catholic Church and conservative political leaders

urged they remain (see Dufour, 1990; Rioux, 1993; Conway, 1997).

In the aftermath of 1885, immigrants quickly filled the West (see Chapter 7). In the early stages, many of these were from Ontario: English, Protestant, and often decidedly anti-Catholic. Soon they were a majority. In 1890, the English-speaking and Protestant legislature of Manitoba abolished Catholic separate schools and declared that French was no longer an official language (Careless, 1970; Conway, 1997). Declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1979, this legislative act nonetheless served its purpose: In the interim, French was reduced to a minority language in Manitoba. The legislature of the North-West Territories in 1892 passed similar language legislation. In 1912, Ontario eliminated French from its public education system. In 1916, Manitoba broke an agreement made with Sir Wilfrid Laurier (1841–1919) when he was prime minister and abolished French and any other language except English from its schools (Conway, 1997: 400; Silver, 1997: 244).

Throughout the 20th century, the minority status of French-Canadians and the political impotence of Quebec within Confederation were thus reinforced again and again. Symbolically, French-Canadians were "put in their place," that is, the place of a vanquished people. Canada was British.

The maintenance of British constitutional symbols, such as the monarchy and the Union Jack, was particularly grating to French-Canadians. For nationalists, such symbols were constant reminders of defeat. For pan-Canadianists, such symbols revealed English-Canadians as slavish colonials unable or unwilling to get on with the task of creating a new nation. Tensions heightened in 1903 with the Boer War, leading to Bourassa's break with the Laurier government. French-English conflict escalated into a full-blown political crisis during the First World War (see also Chapter 7).

Many French-Canadians viewed the First World War as not Canada's fight, and were offended that English-Canadians had allowed themselves and the country to be dragged into the conflict. By contrast, many English-Canadians were still emotionally tied to the British Empire and could not understand the lack of a similar French-Canadian need to defend France. That the umbilical cord between French-Canadians and France had been severed in 1763 entirely escaped most people in English Canada, who viewed French-Canadians *en masse* as disloyal, if not cowardly.

As the war dragged on, the need for fresh troops (and British demands that Canada "pull its weight") caused the Unionist government of Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden (1854–1937) to intensify its efforts at recruitment. These efforts were botched and led in 1916 to anti-recruitment riots in several Quebec towns. Amid continued Quebec opposition, the next year Borden introduced the Military Conscription Bill, and called an election on the issue. Though many Canadians opposed conscription, farmers and labourers among them, the election results revealed a particularly massive fissure between Quebec and the rest of Canada (see appendices 1 and 2). Borden's government won, but there were no French-Canadians from Quebec or Acadia among his MPs (Silver, 1997: 248). The will of the English majority ruled over the French minority, and the Conscription Bill was passed. The riots resumed throughout Quebec (Careless, 1970; Conway, 1997).

In the end, only 60,000 men were actually drafted. A large number of French recruits—as many as 40 percent—did not report (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 254). Few of the conscripts reached the front before the war ended. Bitterness lingered, however, between the French and English communities.

The Conscription Crisis of 1917 was reprised during the Second World

War. In 1940, the Liberals, under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (1874–1950), won re-election, partly on a promise made to Quebec that he would not bring in conscription. Two years later, however, as casualties again mounted, he sought political absolution from his promise through a national referendum. Since the promise had been made to them alone, French Quebecers viewed the matter as one that should have been resolved only with them, not all of Canada (Silver, 1997). Nonetheless, the referendum was held. The outcome was quite predictable. Once again, Quebec was isolated. Quebec voted 73 percent against releasing King from his promise, while the rest of Canada voted 80 percent in favour of the release and, thereby, conscription (Conway, 1997: 47).

In the end, King's adroitness—some would say dithering—forestalled the sort of flare-up that had occurred in 1917. Though anti-conscription riots did occur in parts of Quebec, their intensity was less than in the previous war (see Fraser, 1967: 14). Most Quebecers understood King had gone the extra mile in attempting to meet their objections to conscription.

For many French Quebecers, the hanging of Riel, Canada's ongoing British connection, the conscription crises, and the school controversies symbolized their minority status within Confederation. Too often, when conflicts arose, Quebec's views and interests were ignored. By the late 1940s, the idea of a pan-Canadian, French and English Canada had all but retreated from Canada's political map. More than ever, Canada consisted of "two solitudes."

By then, however, the consequences of two world historical events were rapidly pushing the French and English communities together. The first event was the world wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945. The second event was the intervening economic depression (see Chapter 7). Both of these events had the consequence of enlarging and centralizing state power, the first in making Canada a giant war factory, the second in creating the liberal welfare state (Rice and Prince, 2000). A further consequence was the emergence from the Second World War (in particular) of a new spirit of nationalism in English-speaking Canada. The stage was thus set for a clash over the nature of Canada and Quebec's place within it. These changes in English-speaking Canada cannot be understood, however, without reference to the profound social, economic, and, ultimately, political changes also occurring inside Quebec.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN QUEBEC, 1867–1960

Quebec's population grew from 1.36 million in 1881 to 2.36 million in 1921, then 5.25 million in 1961. Its percentage of the Canadian population declined from 31.4 percent in 1881 to 26.8 percent in 1921, but rebounded to 28.8 percent by 1961 (see Table 1.1). In part, this decline during the middle period resulted from decreased birth rates. Quebec's birth rates fell from a pre-industrial high of 50 per 1,000 to 41.1 in 1884–1885 to 29.2 during the period 1931–1935 when Quebec was rapidly industrializing (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 202). Birth rates in rural areas remained higher than in urban areas, but high death rates, especially infant deaths, reduced overall population growth. During and after the Second World War, however, birth rates once more rebounded—part of the broader Canadian phenomenon known as the baby boom (Chapter 8)—while life expectancy gradually increased.

The larger reason, however, for Quebec's relative decline in population during this period, compared with the rest of Canada, lay in immigration and emigration. The early 20th century witnessed massive European immigration into Canada, especially the West (see

Chapter 7). At the same time, despite the exhortations of church leaders and politicians, many francophone people left the boundaries of Old Quebec. Fearful of their treatment elsewhere in Canada, but finding themselves unable to survive farm life economically, some were convinced to move into the Shield country north of the St. Lawrence. Thus began Quebec's period of northern expansion. Work in New England's lumber mills, however, proved a far greater attraction. Between 1840 and 1930, perhaps 900,000 Quebecers, along with many francophone people from Nova Scotia, moved (in particular) to the New England states (Cook, 1995: 91; see also Dufour, 1990).

Of course, immigrants also came to Quebec. This was not a new occurrence. The potato famine of the 1840s, for example, saw the arrival in Quebec of large numbers of Irish, many of whom as orphaned children were welcomed into francophone families (Dufour, 1990). Immigration intensified during the period 1911–1915, however, resulting in large and thriving Italian and Jewish communities arising in Montreal (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 206). As in the rest of Canada, immigration declined during the two world wars and the intervening Depression years. After 1945, however, as immigrants streamed into Canada, many again located in Quebec. Indeed, the percentage of immigrants to Canada settling in Quebec increased steadily, from 13.6 percent in 1946 to 23.7 percent in 1951 and 23.6 percent again in 1961 (GRES, 1997: 97). Nonetheless, Quebec remained about 80 percent francophone, while the actual number of anglophones declined and became more confined to the Montreal region.

These demographic changes were accompanied by other social and economic changes. For example, agriculture was still an important element of Quebec's economy in 1891, employing 45.5 percent of Quebec's labour force. Even then, however, Quebec was rapidly industrializing. Quebec's transition from a rural and pre-industrial society to an urban, industrial society intensified in the early 20th century, fuelled by the flow of foreign (mainly American) capital into Canada (see Chapter 7). By 1941, agriculture in Quebec employed only 19.3 percent of the workforce (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 213). As noted, some of the "surplus" workers left Quebec. Many more, however, found employment in manufacturing (based on Quebec's abundant hydro power) and resource extraction (especially timber and mining).

The decline in rural Quebec was matched in both relative and absolute terms by growth in urban Quebec. In 1901, 36.1 percent of Quebec's population lived in urban areas; by 1931, the figure was 63.1 percent (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 203). Montreal was the hub of much of this urban growth, spurred by the presence of the head offices for the Bank of Montreal, Sun Life, the Canadian National Railway, and the Canadian Pacific Railway. Other urban centres, many of them resource towns, sprang up across the province.

Again, however, the interrelated social and economic changes that Quebec experienced after Confederation and up until the end of the Second World War were not particularly unusual. Industrialization, urbanization, and assorted social changes occurred throughout Canada (see Chapter 7). What made Quebec's situation different was that the changes it experienced brought into sharp relief the social, political, and ideological structures that had arisen around the Conquest.

As we have seen, Quebec after 1760 was stratified (among other things) along ethnic lines. Whether an individual was French or English influenced his or her occupational status, class position, chances for social mobility, and even the town and neighbourhood in which he or she lived. Curiously, the arrangement

"worked"—if that term can be used—after 1837–1838 precisely because French and English did live in separate worlds.

Industrialization and urbanization disrupted this arrangement, forcing French and English into renewed contact and conflict. For example, industrialization created a (largely) **francophone proletariat.** At work sites, francophone workers found themselves in regular conflict with their anglophone bosses. Class conflict merged with ethnic conflict, creating a dangerous mix that finally exploded at the company town of Asbestos in 1949 (Finkel, 1997: 74). The Asbestos strike became a symbolic rallying point for opponents of the conservative government of Maurice Duplessis (1890–1959) and an economic structure that favoured anglophone-dominated corporations.

Likewise, industrialization, mass communication, and rising levels of literacy also gave rise to new occupations and professional groups. Quebec's new francophone middle class felt thwarted in its aspirations for social and economic advancement (Taylor, 1993: 8–9; Rioux, 1993: 82).

Inevitably, these changes resulted in challenges to the old political order. These challenges came from trade unionists, progressive intellectuals (including some within the Catholic Church), and members of the new middle class and were directed first at replacing Duplessis's Union Nationale government, but the challengers also had broader goals of changing Quebec's role within Confederation.

The challengers were not homogeneous, however. In particular, each possessed a different ideological notion of Quebec's identity and its relation to the rest of Canada.

IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY

What is ideology? **Ideology** is *the set of assumptions, beliefs, explanations, values, and unexamined knowledge through which we come to understand reality* (Marchak, 1988: 1). As we have seen (Chapter 2), the dominant ideology tends to legitimize existing power relations; as Marx (1977a: 236) stated, "The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."

Throughout the late 20th century, federalists and sovereigntists in Quebec argued strongly about Quebec nationalism and its future (see below). They agreed, however, on one thing: Quebec's past (Couture, 1998: 48), in particular that Quebec had been governed, in the words of Rioux (1993), by an "ideology of conservation"—alternatively "conservative nationalism" or (reflecting the influence of the Catholic Church during this period) "**clerico-nationalism**" (Cook, 1995: 91). After the rebellions of 1837–1838, they argued, Quebec had been in a 100-year "time warp," dominated by the Catholic Church, a bourgeois and anglophone business establishment, and an anti-democratic and authoritarian state, resulting in a reactionary and backward society (Trudeau, 1996).

Conservative nationalism stressed French Quebec's unique cultural heritage. The past and rural life were glorified. Engaging in business or seeking material rewards, by contrast, was denounced. So also were Quebecers warned against leaving their homeland, either for the United States (though many did so) or for Canada's opening West: there, the dragons of certain assimilation waited. Furthermore, French Quebecers were charged with a historic and sacred mission to defend and preserve their culture against the English, the last bastion, moreover, of "true" Catholic France. (It was viewed as providential that Quebec had been saved from the radicalism and anticlericalism that had befallen the mother country after the French Revolution of 1789.) Large families were applauded. Catholic, French-speaking, agricultural, and traditional: These were

the idealized traits, federalists and sovereigntists both agreed in the 1950s, that marked Quebec society in the second half of the 19th century and continued largely unchallenged until the end of the Second World War (Rioux, 1993).

There frequently is a kernel of truth in generalizations. The Catholic Church *did* grow more powerful after the failed rebellions, as was reflected in the Ultramontane movement, and continued to exercise considerable influence over Quebec society until the 1950s (Dickinson and Young, 2003). Anglophones *did* dominate Quebec's increasingly capitalist economy after 1880, especially its financial and manufacturing sectors. Quebec's political culture *was* strongly conservative, as represented by the Catholic priest, teacher, and historian Lionel-Adolphe Groulx (1878–1967), whose fierce nationalism also mixed with anti-secularism and, some argue, anti-Semitism. Its political system likewise *did* have anti-democratic and authoritarian aspects. Women, for example, did not get the vote until 1940, civil rights were sometimes abridged, and the state's coercive powers were frequently abused, particularly under the reign of Maurice Duplessis in 1936–1939 and again in 1944–1959 (see Black, 1977), against labour and in defence of private property (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 292–295).

Nonetheless, dominant ideologies rarely go unchallenged. Recently, Couture (1998) has argued that pre-1960s Quebec was never entirely homogeneous. Equally important, he points out that Quebec was not much different from other Canadian provinces of the period. The Ultramontane movement had its counterpart in the Orange movement, which swept Ontario and much of the West (see also Saul, 1997: 32). Into the 1960s, Canada as a whole was socially conservative and highly religious. With the exception of Saskatchewan after 1944 (see Chapter 7), Canadian governments at all levels were business-oriented and, on occasion, authoritarian. Likewise, the economic and social changes (such as urbanization and industrialization) occurring in Quebec during the 20th century were similar in broad terms to those in the other provinces. In short, while displaying some distinct features, Quebec historically was neither entirely monolithic nor dissimilar from much of the rest of Canada.

In the early 1950s, however, the dominance of conservative ideology in Quebec declined in the face of two other ideological views of Quebec's future.

The first of these ideologies was liberal, federalist, and anti-nationalist. Its leaders were Pierre Trudeau (1919–2000), a lawyer and political economist who rose to political prominence during the Asbestos strike, and Gérard Pelletier (1919–1997), a long-time friend, journalist, and social activist. They founded a radical magazine, *Cité libre*, in 1950 to articulate their vision of Quebec's future in Canada. The magazine denounced the insularity and conservatism of Quebec. Though Catholic, the editors also denounced the power of the Catholic Church. Finally, taking a stance that marked his later adult life, Trudeau also denounced Quebec nationalism—indeed, all forms of nationalism, new and old—as retrograde, a reversion to tribalism. Trudeau's vision of Quebec and Canada was essentially liberal, ostensibly valuing the individual over the collective (but see Couture, 1998). He and Pelletier argued that Quebec had all the powers it needed under the British North America Act. What was needed to address Quebec's rising demands was for increased democracy within the province and greater power in Ottawa (McCall-Newman, 1982; Clarkson and McCall, 1990; Balthazar, 1993).

The second ideological strain challenging conservative Quebec was sovereigntist and nationalist. Quebec's intellectual class, especially historians, provided early impetus for the nationalist cause by reinterpreting the history of Quebec in

light of neo-Marxist notions of class and colonial oppression. But other members of the new middle class, such as journalists, broadcasters, and teachers, also were prominent (Rioux, 1993; Cook, 1995). The old Quebec nationalism was cultural rather than political; largely unconcerned with economic development; based on a set of mainly Catholic values; inward looking and defensive; and rejecting of newcomers. By contrast, while the new nationalism shared with the old a belief in the French language and was perhaps even more dedicated to preserving the French fact in North America, it was otherwise opposed, even scornful, of Quebec's traditional culture.

Like the liberal anti-nationalists, the new nationalists favoured modernization and political reform. Unlike the liberals, however, the new nationalists were often stridently anticlerical and highly secular, and their reforms extended into the economy. Most importantly, the new nationalists argued that French culture could survive only if Quebec had the powers of an autonomous state (Balthazar, 1993; Taylor, 1993; Conway, 1997: 52–53). These powers could be exercised within a loose federal arrangement, if not, however, within an independent country.

Embedded in this idea was an important transformation in identity. Prior to the Second World War, Canada's two identities, French-Canadian and English-Canadian, had existed (distantly) side by side. The war, however, fuelled a new sense of nationalism in English-speaking Canada and, by the close of the 1950s, increasing demands for an end to "hyphenated" Canadianism (see Chapter 7). In Quebec, however, these demands and the federal government's increasing encroachment into areas of provincial jurisdiction were viewed as threats. Quebec's long isolation and rejection by the rest of Canada produced finally an identity coincident with the new nationalism. The old nationalism identified with the French language and the Catholic faith; its people were *French-Canadian*. By contrast, the people of the new nationalism were Québécois (Webber, 1994: 49).

Revolutions require not only symbols but ideological justifications and blueprints. Quebec's *Tremblay Report* of 1956 provided both of these. The report became a bible for the Quiet Revolution. In four volumes, it "gave ideological and statistical support to provincial autonomy and to the idea that the Quebec government was the primary defender of a threatened culture" (Dickinson and Young, 2003: 296). In some ways profoundly traditional and nostalgic, the report nonetheless contained two ideas important to debates about Canada and Quebec ever since. First, the report gave voice to a belief already existing in Quebec that Confederation involved a pact between two equal peoples, French and English. Quebec was not "just one" of several provinces. Second, the *Tremblay Report* argued that Quebec was distinct from the other provinces and required continued jurisdictional autonomy in some areas into which the federal government was moving (Cook, 1995: 162).

When Maurice Duplessis died in 1959, the last vestiges of conservative nationalism died with him. The Liberals, led by Jean Lesage (1912–1980), defeated Duplessis's Union Nationale government the next year. Quebec's Quiet Revolution had begun.

CLASHING NATIONALISMS AND QUIET REVOLUTIONS

Lesage's Liberal Party contained elements of both the new liberal and new nationalist factions. In time the marriage would break down. At first, however, the goals of replacing the Union Nationale and modernizing Quebec provided sufficient cement to hold the coalition together.

The Liberals, in their first mandate, moved to bring Quebec's public services

(health, education, labour laws, social welfare) up to the level of the other provinces (Conway, 1997). Political changes were also made. The voting age was lowered from 21 to 18, new laws governing election expenses were passed, and patronage and gerrymandering were attacked. Much of English Canada applauded these steps. Two years later, however, Lesage won re-election using the slogan "*Maîtres chez nous*" ("Masters in our own house"). English Canada grew more wary.

In 1962 the Liberals called an election seeking a mandate to nationalize Quebec's private electric companies. The idea was that of René Lévesque (1922–1987), a former journalist and prominent television commentator, now Lesage's minister of natural resources. Like many Québécois, Lévesque believed Quebec's distinctiveness could be protected only if francophone Quebecers had control over the economy, a belief that in time caused him to leave the Liberal Party and head a nationalist party favouring independence.

In the meantime, however, the Liberals created Hydro-Québec, which quickly became a symbol of Quebec nationalism. Other measures followed, such as the creation in 1965 of the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec, made responsible for Quebec's own pension plan. These actions were popular among Quebec francophones who saw in economic nationalism a means of addressing entrenched inequalities between themselves and the English minority. Quebec's English-dominated business community viewed these actions with alarm, however.

The fears of English-speaking Canadians within Quebec were matched by their counterparts outside the province who were concerned that Quebec nationalism threatened their ideal of "One Canada." Few Canadians were yet travelling across their country; the Trans-Canada Highway was not formally opened until the summer of 1962. Television and radio provided a kind of link, but also reinforced regional and cultural divisions. Indeed, French television in Quebec after 1950 became a chief breeding ground for cultural nationalism (Balthazar, 1993). In consequence, Canadian nationalism exhibited what Rotstein (1978) described as **mapism**, *the tendency of English-speaking Canadians to identify with the shape of Canada as learned in school by looking at the map, but to know nothing about the history or culture of their fellow citizens, especially those in Quebec.* They knew only that Quebec was geographically at Canada's heart, and that Quebec nationalism now seemed to be a dagger pointed at that heart.

For most Quebecers, Canada outside Quebec also remained a mystery; more than a century of parochial education had ensured that. The new nationalists did not harbour any hatred toward English Canada. (This could not be said regarding the dominant anglophone minority within Quebec, especially the business class.) In the main, French Quebecers were simply indifferent to the rest of Canada.

For a few Quebec nationalists, however, the pace of social and political change was too slow. In the early 1960s, the *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ) was formed for the sole purpose of taking Quebec out of Canada, by force if necessary. The FLQ and many of its sympathizers drew their revolutionary ideals from broader social currents of the time, in Canada and abroad. While in English Canada, anti-establishment politics focused upon opposition to the U.S., in Quebec the spirit of revolution focused on anglophone symbols and institutions and their supporters. In the revolutionaries' view, Québec was still a colony. In the blunt words of the nationalist writer Pierre Vallières (1971), francophone Quebecers were "White Niggers." They needed to be liberated.

In 1963, the FLQ began a terrorist campaign directed at symbols of English privilege and power. Banks were robbed,

weapons were stolen, bombs exploded. The campaign began with the bombing of the Wolfe monument in Quebec City—what more symbolic target could there be? Over the next seven years the FLQ proceeded to other targets: McGill and Loyola universities; the Westmount district of Montreal; the Eaton's department store and the Montreal Stock Exchange; the RCMP and the Black Watch Regiment; a monument to Queen Victoria and the Queen's Printer. Six lives were lost. Some of the terrorists were caught, tried, convicted, and sentenced (Conway, 1997: 57).

The FLQ's tactics never had strong support in Quebec; indeed, they were denounced. The bombings served a purpose, however, in garnering English-speaking Canada's attention. Thus began English-speaking Canada's education on Quebec and the history of French-English relations.

COMMISSIONS AND THE "THREE WISE MEN"

In the context of growing civil strife in Quebec and rising angst elsewhere, Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson (1897–1972) created the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Government of Canada, 1963) in 1963. In its preliminary report of 1965 and a final report, encompassing six books, the commission detailed the second-class status of francophones within Quebec and Canada's federal structures. In 1961, for example, unilingual anglophones had the highest average income in Quebec ($6,049), followed by bilingual anglophones ($5,929), bilingual francophones ($4,523), and finally unilingual francophones ($3,107) (Webber, 1994: 45; see also Conway, 1997). Most of Quebec's private sector economy was owned by anglophone Canadians or non-Canadians. Francophones were similarly disadvantaged in the federal civil service, significantly underrepresented and concentrated in the lower tiers of administration. Both inside and outside Quebec, English was the language of work in the federal service. Francophone hospitals, schools, and universities were inferior to those of anglophones (see also Porter, 1965). In short, the pattern of social stratification in Quebec, set in motion by the Conquest, seemed largely unbroken 200 years later.

Even before the commission's final report, acting on its preliminary recommendations and spirit, the Pearson Liberals took several steps. There was never any intent that all of Canada could or should become a completely bilingual country. At the level of federal institutions, however, an intensive French and English language training program was instituted for civil servants. In keeping with its demands for greater control over internal economic affairs, Quebec was allowed to opt out of the Canada Pension Plan (Webber, 1994). And a new Canadian flag also was created (see Chapter 7), one that broke with Canada's long-standing fealty to Britain (Conway, 1997: 60).

These measures had their critics, both among Quebec nationalists who viewed the commission as obscuring their demands, and some in English-speaking Canada who were unsympathetic to francophone demands for equality. Yet, many English-speaking Canadians also accepted, even embraced, the administrative and linguistic changes.

More problematic was the commission's vision of Canada, specifically, the idea that Confederation involved a partnership of the French and English "nations." Very quickly, some academics, including the eminent historian Donald Creighton, denounced this **two nations theory** (a.k.a., **compact theory**) as revisionist (Creighton, 1970). For them, Canada was not a partnership between the French and the English, but rather a partnership of equal provinces

(see Romney, 1999). In Weberian terms, French- and English-speaking Canadians had a very different understanding of the basis of their relationship with the country. The resultant disagreement has continued to frame Canada-Quebec relations and constitutional debates into the present (see Chapter 5).

Jean Marchand (1918–1988) was a prominent member of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Already a well-known labour leader who had fought against the Duplessis regime and worked with Lesage's provincial government, Marchand was approached by Prime Minister Pearson to run for the Liberals. He agreed, but only on condition that his long-time friends Pierre Trudeau and Gérard Pelletier join him. They did, and the three were soon referred to as Quebec's "three wise men." Marchand, Pelletier, and Trudeau believed Quebec's demands for cultural protection could best be met by securing representation within Ottawa. For the Liberal Party, Marchand and his associates also represented the resurrection of an old idea that Canada was the home of both English and French. In English Canada, however, another message was frequently understood: that Quebec's new ministers would stop the nationalist agitation and put Quebec back in its place.

The year 1967 was Canada's centennial. English-speaking Canada was optimistic, its cheery enthusiasm captured by Bobby Gimby's song, "Canada." All Canada and much of the world seemed to congregate that summer in Montreal, home of the "Man and His World" exhibition, to celebrate. But France's president, Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), came to Canada in July on a state visit. Steaming up the St. Lawrence on a French cruiser, he disembarked at Quebec City and proceeded by cavalcade to Montreal. There, overcome by the occasion, speaking from the balcony of city hall, de Gaulle shouted *"Vive le Québec libre!"* The Canadian government was not amused with this break in diplomatic protocol—Quebec and Quebecers did not, in its view, require liberation—and quickly insisted on de Gaulle's exit (see Clarkson and McCall, 1990: 103–104). Nonetheless, for English-speaking Canadians the Quebec "problem" had reared its head once more.

In 1968, Pierre Trudeau succeeded Lester Pearson as leader of the Liberal Party and prime minister. As justice minister in the previous Cabinet, Trudeau had reformed Canada's divorce laws and made liberal amendments to Criminal Code laws on abortion and homosexuality (Clarkson and McCall, 1990: 107). Now, in 1968, Canadians experienced "Trudeaumania" and became familiar for the first time with the word ***charisma***, a term coined by Max Weber (1958: 295), meaning *an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed.*

As prime minister, one of Trudeau's first acts was to bring in the policy of official bilingualism. Following in the footsteps of Henri Bourassa, Trudeau held a pan-Canadian vision of the country, one in which French and English were equal from sea to sea. Quebec nationalism, he believed, would wither as francophones came to feel at home in the rest of Canada. Two years later, however, the Canadian state and society faced a serious challenge from those in Quebec who believed Trudeau did not understand their demands and was selling the rest of Canada a false vision.

THE OCTOBER CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH

On October 5, 1970, members of the FLQ kidnapped James Cross (1921–), a British trade commissioner. The terrorist cell quickly made seven demands in exchange for Cross's release. The Quebec and Canadian governments rejected all demands at first. They

soon relented, however, granting one request: the broadcast and publication of the FLQ's manifesto.

Few Quebecers supported the FLQ's actions. Nonetheless, the manifesto, a broadly Marxist polemic laced with invective and dark humour, drew much applause. In its way, the FLQ touched on real frustrations and angers felt by francophones in the province.

Faced with unexpected public support within Quebec for the FLQ's position, the Quebec government declared on October 10 that no further concessions would be made to the kidnappers. A few hours later, the crisis escalated. Pierre Laporte (1921–1970), Quebec's labour minister, who had only months before nearly been elected provincial Liberal leader, was kidnapped by another FLQ cell acting independently.

René Lévesque, union leaders, and some others demanded negotiations with the FLQ for Cross's and Laporte's lives. Rejecting, however, the notion of a "parallel government," Pierre Trudeau ordered Canadian troops be positioned in Ottawa and the province of Quebec. On October 16, the federal government declared the War Measures Act (WMA). Under this act, all civil rights and liberties in Canada were technically suspended. Those suspected of criminal offences were arrested without charge and held without bail and without trial. The focus was upon Quebec and those suspected of being FLQ supporters, but the Act's application was wider. Under the WMA, 465 Quebec "supporters" were arrested, 403 of whom were released without charge. Of the remainder, 32 were charged but not prosecuted, while 18 were convicted of minor offences (Conway, 1997: 77).

The day after the WMA was declared, Laporte's kidnappers murdered him. The killing intensified feelings of fear and panic, both inside and outside Quebec. Support for the Trudeau government rose, especially in English-speaking Canada. Feelings were more mixed in Quebec, but many also accepted the presence of tanks and the suspension of civil liberties without question.

Laporte's killers were eventually caught, tried, and convicted using regular police methods. Shortly thereafter, in early December, Cross was located and freed in return for his kidnappers' safe passage to Cuba. Over time, all of Cross's kidnappers voluntarily returned to Canada, where they too were tried, convicted, and sentenced (*Maclean's*, 2000).

Thus, the October Crisis—and the Quiet Revolution with it—came to an end. Today, the crisis and the imposition of the War Measures Act remain controversial (see Gagnon, 2000), though replaced in 1988 by the Emergencies Act. Was invoking the WMA necessary? Or was it an overreaction? What is the best way to protect civil society from threat? When is state coercion justified, and what are its limits?

In the short term, Trudeau's government was praised for its handling of the situation, while the use of violence to achieve sovereignty, never widely supported in Quebec, was thoroughly repudiated. Yet, if invoking the WMA was meant to render Quebecers fearful of pursuing nationalism, it utterly failed. Within a few years, support for Quebec nationalism among francophones was stronger than ever.

CONCLUSION

The story of Quebec in the 20th century is one of sociological change. These changes occurred early in the period, but became more obvious (especially to English-speaking Canada) after 1945. Still largely Catholic and conservative at war's end, Quebec only 25 years later was essentially secular and liberal. Birth rates fell remarkably and divorce rates rose. Likewise, sexual mores and social views changed, with Quebecers becoming more

generally liberal in these matters than people elsewhere in North America.

Industrialization, long a fact in Quebec, also continued apace and expanded into the province's north, bringing Quebec society into increasing contact and conflict with its Native population, but economic development also remained uneven. After 1960, social stratification along French-English lines began lessening, and a new francophone bourgeoisie emerged. Rural-urban and gender differences remained, however.

At the same time, these changes were not dissimilar to changes elsewhere in Canadian society during this period. What made the changes occurring in Quebec particularly cogent was that they occurred against the historic backdrop of French-English relations starting with the Conquest. Moreover, Quebec's demands also coincided with and reinforced changes occurring in English-speaking Canada's structure, beliefs, and identity. Sometimes, English-speaking Canada even changed in response to demands it *imagined* French Quebec had made (for example, bilingualism). Throughout the 1960s, Canada and Quebec danced together, each reacting to the other, tailoring their steps, measuring the other's performance. Yet, as the fall of 1970 ended, they were seemingly more separate than ever. Ironically, conflict increased between the French and English groups as the two communities became more functionally integrated and more similar as, to continue the metaphor, their steps became more synchronized. In 1970, no one could be certain how or when the dance would end.

KEY TERMS

charisma
clerico-nationalism
francophone proletariat
ideology
mapism
two nations theory (a.k.a., compact theory)

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. In what ways did English expansion during the 19th and 20th centuries lead to Quebec isolation and a strengthened nationalism in that province?

2. How might structural functionalists and conflict theorists view both differently and similarly the political, economic, cultural, and social changes that occurred in Quebec during the 20th century?

3. Why is symbolism so important in shaping human relations?

4. In what ways do maps help or hinder our ideas about what is real?

5. Does charisma exist within individuals or is it something that their followers "read into" them?

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Conway, John. 1997. *Debts to Pay.* Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.
Written with passion, this book calls upon English-speaking Canada to discover its real history and thereby to understand the legitimate grievances of French-speaking Canada.

Couture, Claude. 1998. *Paddling with the Current: Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Etienne Parent, Liberalism, and Nationalism in Canada.* Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.
This book provides an alternative construction of the career of Pierre Trudeau, liberalism, and nationalism in Canada.

Romney, Paul. 1999. *Getting It Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and Imperilled Confederation.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
This book tells the story of how Confederation came about and holds lessons for Canadians today who seek constitutional reform.