{"id":982,"date":"2015-02-09T17:36:26","date_gmt":"2015-02-09T22:36:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/?page_id=982"},"modified":"2018-09-12T13:23:48","modified_gmt":"2018-09-12T17:23:48","slug":"vol-35-no-3-summer-2014","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/back-issues\/2014-2\/vol-35-no-3-summer-2014\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 35, Number 3, Summer"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>Knowing How it Feels: On the Relevance of Epistemic\u00a0Access for the Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness<\/strong>
\nItay Shani,\u00a0Kyung Hee University<\/p>\n

Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects \u2014 the informational and the phenomenal \u2014 is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one\u2019s experiential domain.<\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this article should be\u00a0addressed to Itay Shani, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Kyung Hee University, 1 Hoegi dong,\u00a0Dongdaemun gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea. Email: ishani479@hotmail.com<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/a>Development of the Self in Society:\u00a0French Postwar Thought on Body, Meaning,\u00a0and Social Behavior\u00a0<\/strong>
\nLine Joranger, Telemark University College<\/p>\n

The development of the self and behavior toward others were heavily discussed during the\u00a0French postwar era. According to Foucault, Sartre, and Merleau\u2013Ponty, intersubjective\u00a0social relations are physical and bodily connections. The physical body is our point of\u00a0contact with the world, which is a practical world, which we typically engage before any\u00a0kind of theoretical understanding of what things or people are like. Although there are\u00a0a number of differences in their ways of thinking concerning the development of the self\u00a0and social behavior, this paper shows that Foucault and Sartre seem to share Hyppolite\u2019s\u00a0notion that the fulfillment of the absolute self will always be deferred because of an ongoing\u00a0contradiction in our social behavior.<\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Line Joranger, Associate Professor,\u00a0Department of Health and Social Sciences, Telemark University College, Kj\u00f8lnes ring 56, 3918\u00a0Porsgrunn, Norway. Email: line.joranger@hit.no<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/a>Expressivism, Self-Knowledge, and Describing\u00a0One\u2019s Experiences<\/strong>
\nTero Vaaja,\u00a0University of Jyv\u00e4skyl\u00e4<\/p>\n

In this article, I defend an account of self-knowledge that allows us a considerable first person\u00a0authority regarding our subjective experiences without invoking privileged access. I\u00a0examine expressivism about avowals by contrasting it with \u201cdetectivist\u201d and \u201cconstitutivist\u201d\u00a0accounts of self-knowledge, following the use of these terms by David Finkelstein. I proceed\u00a0to present a version of expressivism that preserves some of the valid motivating insights of\u00a0detectivism and constitutivism as essential parts. Finally, I point out how my account views\u00a0self-knowledge as a cognitive and conceptual ability that can be cultivated; the account\u00a0construes self-knowledge as a process.<\/p>\n

Correspondence considering this article should be addressed to Tero Vaaja, Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos, PL35 (Ylist\u00f6nm\u00e4entie 33), 40014 Jyv\u00e4skyl\u00e4n yliopisto, Finland. Email: tero.t.vaaja@jyu.fi<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/a>\u201cFeeling what Happens\u201d: Full Correspondence\u00a0and the Placebo Effect<\/strong>
\nAndr\u00e9 LeBlanc, John Abbott College and Concordia University<\/p>\n

This paper proposes a theory whereby the physiological changes induced by placebos are\u00a0accompanied by corresponding changes in the patient\u2019s mental state. I begin by defining\u00a0the placebo problem, and review the three leading theoretical approaches for solving\u00a0it \u2014 meaning theory, expectancy theory, and conditioning theory \u2014 before discussing\u00a0the significant theoretical issue posed by a classic case of placebo immunosuppression\u00a0in rats. The theory of full correspondence is then introduced as a way of explaining the\u00a0nature of the placebo effect and of resolving the conflict between \u201cmeaning-oriented\u201d\u00a0and \u201cmechanism-oriented\u201d approaches to the phenomenon. After proposing how to test\u00a0the theory experimentally and examining existing evidence for it, I consider its ability to\u00a0integrate the dominant theoretical perspectives of the placebo effect within a framework\u00a0centered on the patient\u2019s subjective experience, the one variable overlooked on both sides\u00a0of the meaning\/mechanism divide.<\/p>\n

Correspondence for this article should be addressed to Andr\u00e9 LeBlanc, Department\u00a0of History, Economics and Political Science, John Abbott College, 21,275 Lakeshore Rd., Ste. Anne de\u00a0Bellevue, Quebec, H9X 3L9 Canada. Email: andre.leblanc@johnabbott.qc.ca<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Book Review\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/a>The Peripheral Mind: Philosophy of Mind and\u00a0the Peripheral Nervous System<\/em><\/span>
\nBook Author:\u00a0Istv\u00e1n\u00a0Aranyosi. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013, 256 pages, $60.00\u00a0hard cover.
\nReviewed by Michael Madary, Universit\u00e4t Mainz<\/p>\n

Much of the action and excitement in the philosophy of mind over the last couple of decades has been in a movement to look beyond the brain for locating and explaining mental states. This movement consists in a number of different claims. We have heard, for instance, that the mind extends into artifacts, and that the mind is brought forth or enacted or constituted by the active living body. In his recent book, The Peripheral Mind<\/em>, Istv\u00e1n Aranyosi defends a neglected middle ground in the debate, a middle ground between the brain and the external world. Aranyosi urges that we take seriously the peripheral nervous system in our investigation into the mind. More specifically, the main thesis of his book is the peripheral mind hypothesis, which is that \u201cConscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes are partly constituted by subprocesses occurring at the level of the [peripheral nervous system]\u201d (p. 22).<\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this review should be addressed to Dr. Michael Madary, Johannes Gutenberg\u2013Universit\u00e4t Mainz, FB05 Philosophe und Philosogie, Jakob Welder Weg 18, 55099 Mainz, Germany. Email: madary@uni_mainz.de<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Knowing How it Feels: On the Relevance of Epistemic\u00a0Access for the Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness Itay Shani,\u00a0Kyung Hee University Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects \u2014 the informational and the phenomenal \u2014 is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1232,"featured_media":0,"parent":911,"menu_order":2,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_kad_blocks_custom_css":"","_kad_blocks_head_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_body_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_footer_custom_js":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-982","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\nVolume 35, Number 3, Summer - The Journal of Mind and Behavior - University of Maine<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/back-issues\/2014-2\/vol-35-no-3-summer-2014\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Volume 35, Number 3, Summer - The Journal of Mind and Behavior - University of Maine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Knowing How it Feels: On the Relevance of Epistemic\u00a0Access for the Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness Itay Shani,\u00a0Kyung Hee University Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. 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