{"id":475,"date":"2014-07-31T14:51:49","date_gmt":"2014-07-31T18:51:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/?page_id=475"},"modified":"2018-09-12T14:32:36","modified_gmt":"2018-09-12T18:32:36","slug":"volume-17-number-2-spring-1996","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/back-issues\/1996-2\/volume-17-number-2-spring-1996\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 17, Number 2, Spring"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>Social Epistemology and the Recovery of the Normative in the Post-Epistemic Era
\n<\/b>Steve Fuller, University of Durham
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,<\/i>\u00a0Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 83\u201398, ISSN 0271\u20130137
\nWhat marks ours as the “post-epistemic era” is that it refuses to confer any special privilege on knowledge production as a social practice: whatever normative strictures apply to social practices in general, they apply specifically to epistemic practices as well. I trace how we have reached this state by distinguishing two conceptions of normativity in the history of epistemology: a top-down approach epitomized by Kant and Bentham, and a bottom-up approach associated with the Scottish Enlightenment. The advantage of the latter is that it clearly distinguishes the emergence of norms from the conditions of their maintenance. I then show how more recent evolutionary epistemology has, in a pejorative way, “naturalized” socially constructed norms of cognitive competence, whereas the logical positivists \u2014 long the bane of “progressive” epistemologists \u2014 recognized the fully artificial character of epistemic norms and hence qualify as the first social epistemologists.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Steve Fuller, Ph.D., Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3JT, England.<\/p>\n

<\/a>Problems with the Cognitive Psychological Modeling of Dreaming
\n<\/b>Mark Blagrove, University of Wales Swansea
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,<\/i>\u00a0Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 99\u2013134, ISSN 0271\u20130137
\nIt is frequently assumed that dreaming can be likened to such waking cognitive activities as imagination, analogical reasoning, and creativity, and that these models can then be used to explain instances of problem solving during dreams. This paper emphasizes instead the lack of reflexivity and intentionality within dreams, which undermines their characterization as analogs of the waking world, and opposes claims that dreams can complement and aid waking world problem solving. The importance of reflexivity in imagination, in analogical reasoning and in creativity means that dreaming, being usually single-minded, cannot be subsumed into these categories. Freud\u2019s hypothesis that dreams result from the translation of latent thoughts into manifest content is taken to support this idea of cognitive deficiency during dreaming. Dream content, however, can still represent and reflect the dreamer\u2019s waking concerns.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Mark Blagrove, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of Wales Swansea, SA2 8PP, United Kingdom.<\/p>\n

<\/a>Mad Liberation: The Sociology of Knowledge and the Ultimate Civil Rights Movement
\n<\/b>Robert E. Emerick, San Diego State University
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,<\/i>\u00a0Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 135\u2013160, ISSN 0271\u20130137<\/p>\n

Mad liberation \u2014 the former mental patient self-help movement \u2014 is characterized in this paper as a true progressive social movement. A sociology of knowledge perspective is used to account for much of the research literature that argues, to the contrary, that self-help groups do not represent a true social movement. Based on the “myth of individualism” and the “myth of simplicity,” the psychological literature on self-help has defined empowerment in self-help groups as an individual-change or therapeutic orientation. This paper, adopting a sociological perspective, argues that, in fact, empowerment in the mad liberation movement is typically a socio-political concept used to promote social change and the civil rights of mental patients. Accordingly, examples of social changes brought about by members of the mad liberation movement are cited in support of the claim that this movement fits the criteria of a progressive social movement.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert E. Emerick, Ph.D., Department of Sociology, San Diego State University, San Diego, California 92182\u20134423.<\/p>\n

<\/a>The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Consideration of the Problem with Special Reference to Husserl\u2019s Phenomenological Account
\n<\/b>Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,<\/i>\u00a0Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 161\u2013184, ISSN 0271\u20130137
\nIn the succession of states of consciousness that constitute James\u2019s stream of consciousness, there occur, among others, states of consciousness that are themselves, or that include, perceptual mental acts. It is assumed some of the latter states of consciousness are purely perceptual, lacking both imaginal and signitive contents. According to Husserl, purely perceptual acts present to consciousness, uniquely, their environmental objects in themselves, in person. They do not present, as imaginal mental acts do, an image or other representation of their object. Husserl\u2019s theory resembles Gibson\u2019s with respect to perception\u2019s being direct. Both theorists hold perceptual awareness of the environment is not a “founded” act; its proximate causation does not involve any other mental act. Both theorists contend that perceptual acts keep the perceiver directly in touch with the surrounding environment. The present article considers Husserl\u2019s account of this directness. Although this account has problems, and is largely phenomenological description, it may help psychologists to find their way to an adequate account of the objects of perceptual consciousness \u2014 perhaps if it is integrated with Gibson\u2019s perception theory, as I will attempt in a sequel to which this article is introductory. Husserl seeks to provide the phenomenological side of the story, Gibson the stimulus-informational side.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, California 95616\u20138686; or e-mail to tnatsoulas@ucdavis.edu<\/p>\n

<\/a>The Sciousness Hypothesis \u2014 Part II
\n<\/b>Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,\u00a0<\/i>Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 185\u2013206, ISSN 0271\u20130137
\nThe Sciousness Hypothesis holds that how we know our mental-occurrence instances does not include our having immediate awareness of them. Rather, we take notice of our behaviors or bodily reactions and infer mental-occurrence instances that would explain them. In\u00a0The Principles,<\/i>James left it an open question whether the Sciousness Hypothesis is true, although he proceeded on the conviction that one\u2019s mental life consists exclusively of mental-occurrence instances of which one has (or could have had) immediate awareness. Nevertheless, James was tempted by the Sciousness Hypothesis; and he adopted the kind of account of inner awareness favored among present-day psychologists of consciousness: to the effect that awareness of a mental-occurrence instance does not take place from within its phenomenological structure, always from a certain distance, by means of a distinct mental-occurrence instance. This means that the immediacy of inner awareness can only be a temporal and causal immediacy, not the kind we seem actually to have, whereby we consciously participate in the occurrence of a mental state. The present article, which is published in two separate though continuous parts, clarifies and elaborates the Sciousness Hypothesis, and critically discusses it and the kind of account of inner awareness that seems to be closest to it.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, California 95616\u20138686; or e-mail to tnatsoulas@ucdavis.edu
\n<\/i>
\n<\/a>Book Reviews<\/b><\/p>\n

Logical Learning Theory: A Human Teleology and Its Empirical Support
\n<\/b><\/em>Book Author:\u00a0<\/span><\/span>Joseph F. Rychlak. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994
\nReviewed by Wayne Viney, Colorado State University
\nThe Journal of Mind and Behavior,\u00a0<\/i>Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 207\u2013212, ISSN 0271\u20130137
\n[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] William James once defined philosophy as the habit of always seeing an alternative. In that same spirit, Joseph F. Rychlak, in a long and integrated series of books and articles, calls on psychologists to be more philosophical in the Jamesian sense, and thus more open to alternative approachs to their discipline. Rychlak\u2019s recent book\u00a0Logical Learning Theory: A Human Teleology and Its Empirical Support\u00a0<\/i>is an application of a naturalistic and rigorous humanism to “experimental literature in cognitive processing, human and animal learning, memory, emotion, motivation, perception, brain functioning, human development, language acquistion, and self-image” (p. xix). This review covers the basic outline or architecture of the book, some of the concepts that are key to understanding Rychlak\u2019s systematic position, examples of empirical support, and appreciative and critical commentary.<\/p>\n

Requests for reprints should be sent to Wayne Viney, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523.<\/p>\n

Save<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Social Epistemology and the Recovery of the Normative in the Post-Epistemic Era Steve Fuller, University of Durham The Journal of Mind and Behavior,\u00a0Spring 1996, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pages 83\u201398, ISSN 0271\u20130137 What marks ours as the “post-epistemic era” is that it refuses to confer any special privilege on knowledge production as a social practice: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1232,"featured_media":0,"parent":88,"menu_order":2,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_kad_blocks_custom_css":"","_kad_blocks_head_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_body_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_footer_custom_js":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-475","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\nVolume 17, Number 2, Spring - The Journal of Mind and Behavior - University of Maine<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/back-issues\/1996-2\/volume-17-number-2-spring-1996\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Volume 17, Number 2, Spring - 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