{"id":3501,"date":"2019-08-31T13:24:14","date_gmt":"2019-08-31T17:24:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/?page_id=3501"},"modified":"2020-05-30T21:23:38","modified_gmt":"2020-05-31T01:23:38","slug":"vol-40-number-2-spring-2019","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/vol-40-number-2-spring-2019\/","title":{"rendered":"Vol. 40, Number 2, Spring 2019"},"content":{"rendered":"

A No-Go Theorem for the Mind\u2013Body Problem: An Informal <\/b>Proof that No Purely
\nPhysical System Can Exhibit All the <\/b>Properties of Human Consciousness
\n<\/b>Catherine M. Reason<\/span>, London<\/span><\/p>\n

This article presents an operationalized solution to the mind\u2013body problem which relies on a well-defined effective procedure rather than philosophical argument. I identify a specific operation which is a necessary property of all healthy human conscious individuals \u2014 specifically the operation of self-certainty, or the capacity of healthy conscious humans to \u201cknow\u201d with certainty that they are conscious. This operation is shown to be inconsistent with the properties possible in any meaningful definition of a physical system. I demonstrate this inconsistency by proving a \u201cno-go\u201d theorem for any physical system capable of human logical reasoning, if this reasoning is required to be both sound and consistent. The proof of this theorem is both general \u2014 it applies to any function whereby evidence affects the state of some physical system \u2014 and recursive, since any physical process subserving a function of this type is shown to imply another such function. Thus, for at least one aspect of human consciousness, the mind\u2013body problem is resolved.<\/p>\n

Correspondence should be addressed to\u00a0Catherine M. Reason, Institute of Mind and Behavior, PO Box 522, Village Station, New York, New York 10014. Email: CMRneuro@gmail.com<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Learning How to Represent: An Associationist Account
\n<\/b>Nancy A. Salay, <\/span>Queen\u2019s University<\/span><\/p>\n

The paper develops a positive account of the representational capacity of cognitive systems: simple, associationist learning mechanisms and an architecture that supports bootstrapping are sufficient conditions for becoming a representation user. In terms of the debates within the philosophy of mind, this paper offers a plausibility account of representation externalism, an alternative to the internalist, reductive models of intentionality that still play a leading role in the field. Although the central theme here is representation, methodologically this view complements embodied, enactivist approaches to studying cognition.<\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nancy A. Salay, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Queen\u2019s University, Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6, Canada. Email: salay@queensu.ca<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Critical Notices<\/strong><\/p>\n

Beyond Neurocentric Psychiatry: An Analysis of <\/b>Fuchs\u2019 Enactive\u2013Ecological Concept of the Mind
\n<\/b>Susana Ram\u00edrez\u2013Vizcaya<\/span>, National Autonomous University of Mexico<\/span><\/p>\n

Book Title: Ecology of the Brain: The Phenomenology and Biology of the Emodied Mind
\n<\/span><\/em>Book Author: Thomas Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 334 pages, $46.95 paperback.<\/span><\/p>\n

Research into the brain sciences has received an explosive growth in funding and attention from academia, industry, healthcare institutions, media, and general public in the last decades. The Human Brain Project, for instance, is one of the two largest scientific research projects that the European Union has ever funded, while the BRAIN Initiative is an ambitious project supported by public and private sectors in the United States. It is undeniable that plentiful scientific advancements have been achieved regarding the neurobiology of mental processes and illness during these last decades. However, this enthusiasm for the brain has led to a view where the whole spectrum of mental phenomena is explained appealing to a complex network of neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters, and hormones. Under this picture, subjectivity has been largely seen either as identical to neurobiological processes or as no more than epiphenomena without any causal power, while the body and the environment have been portrayed as just a source of inputs to be processed by this powerful computing machine that is the brain.<\/span><\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Susana Ram\u00edrez\u2013Vizcaya, Posgrado en Filosof\u00eda de la Ciencia, UNAM, Unidad de Posgrado, Edificio E, Primer nivel, Circuito de Posgrados, Ciudad Universitaria, Av. Universidad 3000, CDMX, M\u00e9xico, 04510. Email: susana.rv09@gmail.com<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Biophilosophy
\n<\/b>Christopher Stephens, <\/span>University of British Columbia<\/span><\/p>\n

Book Title: How Biology Shapes\u00a0Philosophy: New Foundations for\u00a0Naturalism
\n<\/span><\/em>Book Author: David Livingstone Smith (Editor). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017,\u00a0364 pages, $99.99 hardcover.<\/span><\/p>\n

How Biology Shapes Philosophy <\/i>is a collection of thirteen new essays by leading, naturalistically inclined philosophers who draw on biology to answer traditional philosophical questions about the nature of mind, rationality, semantics, ethics, race, gender, and human nature. In his introductory essay, the editor David Livingstone Smith contrasts biophilosophy<\/i> \u2014 using biology to answer philosophical questions \u2014 with philosophy of biology<\/i> \u2014 using philosophical tools to help answer or clarify theoretical biology. To do biophilosophy well, one must get the science right, but one must also do philosophy of biology, since this helps us better understand the science. All of the contributors to this volume have made important contributions to both of these endeavors. The focus here is on biophilosophy.<\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to\u00a0<\/span>Christopher Stephens, Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall E370, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1 Canada. Email: chris.stephens@ubc.ca<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Book Review<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Psychology of Chess<\/em>
\n<\/b><\/span>Book Author: Fernand Gobet
\nReviewed by Neil Charness, Florida State University<\/span><\/p>\n

This slim volume provides an informative and entertaining look at the psychology of chess from someone who is uniquely positioned to comment from the point of view of both a researcher and a high caliber player. Fernand Gobet has had a long, highly successful career as a researcher studying expertise in chess, among other topics. He also reached the International Master (IM) level as a chess player before apparently deciding that studying chess as an academic would be a better career path than trying to become a professional player. The research community is indeed grateful for that choice. Gobet has had the benefit of rubbing shoulders not only with some of the world\u2019s top chess players, but also with a Nobel-prize winning scientist, Herbert Simon, who was instrumental in initiating the modern experimental study of chess expertise with his colleague William Chase. Gobet has also collaborated with one of the early, towering giants of chess research, Adriaan de Groot, a Dutch psychologist whose doctoral dissertation written during World War II on<\/span> Thought and Choice in Chess<\/i> (1946\/1978) helped uncover some of the primary phenomena about chess search processes and chess perception that are still being elaborated on by today\u2019s researchers. Gobet\u2019s insights into both research and practice have generated a very readable account of the psychological processes underlying expertise in chess.<\/span><\/p>\n

Correspondence concerning this review should be addressed to Dr. Neil Charness, Psychology Department, Florida State University, 1107 West Call Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32306. Email: charness@psy.fsu.edu<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A No-Go Theorem for the Mind\u2013Body Problem: An Informal Proof that No Purely Physical System Can Exhibit All the Properties of Human Consciousness Catherine M. Reason, London This article presents an operationalized solution to the mind\u2013body problem which relies on a well-defined effective procedure rather than philosophical argument. I identify a specific operation which is […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1232,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_kad_blocks_custom_css":"","_kad_blocks_head_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_body_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_footer_custom_js":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3501","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\nVol. 40, Number 2, Spring 2019 - The Journal of Mind and Behavior - University of Maine<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/umaine.edu\/jmb\/vol-40-number-2-spring-2019\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Vol. 40, Number 2, Spring 2019 - The Journal of Mind and Behavior - University of Maine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"A No-Go Theorem for the Mind\u2013Body Problem: An Informal Proof that No Purely Physical System Can Exhibit All the Properties of Human Consciousness Catherine M. 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