Volume 20, Number 3, Summer

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics: The Connection and Analogies

Bruce Rosenblum, University of California, Santa Cruz

Fred Kuttner, Northwestern Polytechnic University

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 229–256, ISSN 0271–0137

Consciousness and the measurement problem of quantum mechanics have a logical connection and an historical involvement. Moreover, current issues in the two arenas have striking similarities. Whether or not consciousness warrants quantum mechanical consideration, analogies between quantum measurement and consciousness are tantalizing and suggestive. After a review of how the issue of consciousness arises in quantum mechanics (but not in classical physics), and after a brief discussion of the implications of the measurement problem for reductionism, we develop a series of analogies between consciousness and quantum mechanics. We conclude that any substantial advance in one arena would at the least offer hints for routes to take in the other.

For comments on the subject and on a draft of this paper we express gratitude to David Chalmers, Donald Coyne, Gaston Fischer, Nick Herbert, Stanley Klein, Melanie Mayer, Andrew Neher, William Rowe, and Henry Stapp. It is with deep regret that we are unable to include the late Euan Squires, whose recent work has been a major stimulus to us. Requests for reprints should be sent to Bruce Rosenblum, Ph.D., Department of Physics, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064.

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: IV. An Argument from How Conscious₄ Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem

Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 257–276, ISSN 0271–0137

More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness (i.e., direct occurrent awareness of the act) is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness (i.e., occurrent awareness of or as though of something else) that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one of his arguments, and my discussion focuses largely on how David M. Rosenthal, who holds instead that inner awareness is accomplished by a separate mental-occurrence instance, has interpreted the empirical evidence that Woodruff Smith cites. Woodruff Smith considers how a conscious4 mental-occurrence instance seems to its owner to be empirical evidence that lends support to intrinsic theory of inner awareness. When one introspects a mental-occurrence instance, one finds a single unified experience, not two of them as Rosenthal proposes. Rosenthal accepts this firsthand evidence as tending to support intrinsic theory, but tries to explain the appearances away, mentioning G.E. Moore’s description of consciousness as “transparent.”

Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, California 95616–8686. Email: tnatsoulas@ucdavis.edu

Theory in Psychology: A Reply to Tryon’s “Measurement Units and Theory Construction”

Altan Löker, Istanbul, Turkey

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 277–294, ISSN 0271–0137

Tryon advises psychologists to construct theories as physicists do, and claims that a theory of physics is a system of algebraic relations which constitute the definitions of new concepts and their units of measurement in terms of existing ones, at least two basic units being initially adopted. He says that these algebraic relations create a knowledge hierarchy, which he considers a theory. In reality, only some of the mathematical relations of physics are definitions, which introduce new tools, while the rest of them express the “laws of nature,” the discovery of which is the primary objective of science. Tryon also says that these algebraic relations express quantitative, logical, and conceptual equivalences. He is wrong again, because only the relations that constitute definitions express conceptual equivalences, while the laws of nature are discovered either by making measurements or by constructing theories. Tryon says nothing about the discovery of the laws of nature either way, and appears to consider the concept of “law of nature” as unscientific. He also believes that measurements serve only to determine the characteristic properties of substances. In this article, the usefulness of the concept of “law of nature” is illustrated, and more importantly, the method of theory construction used in physics and the way in which it can be adapted to psychology are explained.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Altan Löker, Lalasahin 23/5, Ferikoy, Istanbul 80260, Turkey. Email: alloker@superonline.com or alloker@usa.net

Measurement Units and Theory Construction: A Reply to Löker’s “Theory in Psychology”

Warren W. Tryon, Fordham University

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 295–298, ISSN 0271–0137

Tryon’s (1996) primary thesis and four corollary points are restated. Seven of Löker’s primary criticisms are identified and rebutted. It is concluded that measurement units are theoretical entities because they concern the quanta being measured and that these entities can be combined in various ways to generate new theoretical concepts.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Warren W. Tryon, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Fordham University, Bronx, New York 10458–5198 or Email: Wtryon@Fordham.edu

A Reply to Tryon’s: “A Reply to Löker’s ‘Theory in Psychology'”

Altan Löker, Istanbul, Turkey

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 299–310, ISSN 0271–0137

Tryon’s (1999) reply to Löker’s (1999) criticisms of Tryon’s (1996) “Measurement Units and Theory Construction” necessitates clarification at several points and the correction of the errors it contains. Tryon appears to have changed some of his positions, perhaps being influenced by my (Löker, 1999) criticisms, but he still ignores how theories are constructed. Tryon even states that my explanations of how theories are constructed in physics and how they can be constructed in psychology are outside the scope of his article, despite the fact that the title, main topic, and the conclusion of his original article concern theory construction in psychology which is the reason, no doubt, why his article was published in a psychology journal. His mistakes about, and distortions of, my ideas and also his distortions of his own earlier (Tryon, 1996) statements are exposed and corrected in the present article.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Altan Löker, Lalasahin 23/5, Ferikoy, Istanbul 80260, Turkey. Email: alloker@superonline.com or alloker@usa.net

A Close and Critical Examination of How Psychopharmacotherapy Research is Conducted

David H. Jacobs, California Institute for Human Science

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 311–350, ISSN 0271–0137

This paper conducts a critical examination of the “usual psychopharmacology standards” for clinical research. Four main areas are inspected: (a) What is “it” that is being treated in a clinical drug study? (b) How much is really known concerning the psychological alterations brought about by psychiatric drug treatment? (c) To what extent are sources of bias actually controlled for in “controlled” drug treatment studies? (d) How does the usual “dropout pattern” influence the alleged “clinical findings” of controlled drug treatment studies? The overall conclusion reached is that the “usual standards” cannot produce a realistic picture of either safety or efficacy. Conceptual and methodological reforms are suggested.

Requests for reprints should be sent to David H. Jacobs, Ph.D., Psychotherapy Associates, 528 Fourth Street, Encinitas, California 92024.

Book Review

In Defense of Human Consciousness

Book Author: Joseph F. Rychlak. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1997Reviewed by L.M. Leitner, Miami University

The Journal of Mind and Behavior,

Summer 1999, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pages 351–356, ISSN 0271–0137

[Note: First paragraph, no abstract avaiable.] In Defense of Human Consciousness, by Joe Rychlak, is an attempt to apply a teleological theory of mind to the multifaceted phenomena of “consciousness.” As with Rychlak’s other writings (e.g., 1981, 1988, 1994), this volume is intellectually thorough, challenging, and well worth the time and effort needed to grasp its points. Rychlak begins by lamenting the ways that traditional approaches to psychology have eliminated any sophisticated discussion of consciousness and free will. His solution is a philosophically rigorous “enlightened return to the terminology that was jettisoned in science 300 years ago for a good reason but is now under continued repression for a bad reason (i.e., to defend the Newtonian status quo)” [p. xiv].

Requests for reprints should be sent to L. M. Leitner, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056.