Skip Navigation

1986 - Volume 7, Number 4, Autumn

Consciousness and Memory
Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 463-502, ISSN 0271-0137
This article introduces the concept of retrowareness — which refers to the veridical nonperceptual occurrent awareness of something about a particular past event or state of affairs. The first major section considers various features of this new concept and the concept of reporting the past. The second major section discusses what it is for a retrowareness to be a conscious as opposed to an unconscious mental occurrence. This discussion requires that kinds of unconsciousness, including the Freudian kind, receive some attention. The third major section examines the relation of retrowareness to remembering, with special reference to Tulving’s recent discussion of autonoetic consciousness. The final section addresses some objections and qualifications of views already appearing in the article.

Requests for reprints may be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Psychology Department, University of California, Davis, California 95616.

Is Mental Illness Ineradicably Normative? — A Reply To W. Miller Brown
Paul G. Muscari, State University College at Glens Falls
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 503-514, ISSN 0271-0137
In his recent article, “A Critique of Three Conceptions of Mental Illness,” Brown (1985) raises doubts as to whether the traditional concept of “mental illness” can truly possess either existential or practical import. Holding to a Szasz/Foucault line, Brown argues that mental illness should be looked upon as evaluative, but not as symptomatic of a disease condition and not as something that can be based on theoretical grounds. What I argue in this paper is that the Szasz/Foucault line of argument that Brown maintains is not tenable; that mental illness is not a metaphorical reaction to a breakdown in social interpersonal relations, but a deeply laid condition characterized by the absence of structurally integrated thought.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Paul G. Muscari, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, State University College at Glens Falls, Bay Road, Glens Falls, New York 12801.

The Differential Organization of the Structures of Consciousness during Hypnosis and a Baseline Condition
Ronald J. Pekala, Coatesville V.A. Medical Center and Jefferson Medical College and V.K. Kumar, West Chester University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 515-540, ISSN 0271-0137
Patterns of consciousness associated with a baseline condition of eyes closed and an hypnotic induction condition were compared across individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility. Phenomenological experience on 12 dimensions was quantified by the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the relationships among the dimensions were diagramed. Results indicated that high susceptible subjects, vis-a-vis lows, reported experiencing a significantly different pattern of interrelationships among the PCI dimensions during the hypnotic induction condition in comparison to eyes closed. The nature of these pattern differences suggests that hypnosis has differential effects upon the organization of the reported phenomenological structures of consciousness for high and low susceptible subjects.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Ronald J. Pekala, Ph.D., Psychology Service (116B), Coatesville V.A. Medical Center, Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320.

Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification
Shaun Gallagher, Canisius College
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 541-554, ISSN 0271-0137
In this paper the author argues that body image and body schema are two distinct concepts and ought to be kept conceptually distinct. In current psychological and phenomenological studies on body experience these concepts are confused. This confusion is shown to revolve around the question concerning the status of the body as an intentional object of consciousness. Several criteria that help to differentiate between these two concepts are offered. The body image is a conscious image or representation, owned, but abstract and disintegrated, and appears to be something in-itself, differentiated from its environment. In contrast, the body schema operates in a non-conscious way, is pre-personal, functions holistically, and is not something in-itself apart from its environment. Some implications for the study of body experience are explored.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Shaun Gallagher, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo, New York, 14208.

William James on Free Will and Determinism
Donald Wayne Viney, Pittsburg State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 555-566, ISSN 0271-0137
James’s classic article “The Dilemma of Determinism” represents only an early and partial statement on his views of free will and determinism. James’s mature position incorporates the arguments of “The Dilemma of Determinism” into a robust theory of free will which at once explains the operations of free effort and delineates the scope of legitimate psychological explanation. Free will is an issue of fact while being beyond the competence of psychological science.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Donald Wayne Viney, Ph.D., Department of Social Science/Philosophy, Pittsburg State University, Pittsburg, Kansas 66762.

Light as an Expression of Mental Activity
Douglas M. Snyder, Berkely, California
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 567-584, ISSN 0271-0137
Fundamental features of special relativity and quantum mechanics, cornerstones of moden physical theory, are explored and found to allow and support the notion that mental activity lies at the core of the physical world. This notion is consonant with the proposition that light, in addition to its explicit formulation in special relativiity, may be regarded as an expression of mental activity and as such, capable of instantaneous transmission of information. Precise and reproducible experimental evidence supporting quantum mechanics is shown to constitute evidence for the important involvement of mental activity in the functioning of the physical world.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas M. Snyder, Ph.D., P.O. Box 228, Berkeley, California 94701.

The Paradoxical Implications of the () Phenomenological Reduction in Sartre’s Psychoanalysis
Imad T. Shouery, Indiana State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 585-590, ISSN 0271-0137
An examination of Sartre’s notion of consciousness reveals a paradoxical relation between the nature of consciousness and its application to his theory of existential psychoanalysis. The difficulty emerges as a consequence of the radicalization of the phenomenological reduction wherein consciousness appears as non-egological, and exemplifies Sartre’s notion of bad faith. If one attempts to be consistent in applying the Sartrian notion of consciousness to psychoanalysis an impasse between analyst and patient is created. This paper discusses this impasse and makes suggestions for alternate solutions.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Imad T. Shourey, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809.

Book Reviews

Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance
Book Author: Laurence D. Smith. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986
Reviewed by Kurt Danziger, York University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 591-592, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] Although this is a historical work its appeal is not to antiquarian interests. Rather, it speaks to fundamental issues that are still very much alive in contemoorary Psychology. A preoccupation with its problematic status among the sciences marked modern Psychology from the beginning. At the time that the influence of neobehaviorism was at its height, around the middle of the present century, this preoccupation became a veritable obsession. In fact, a major factor in neobehaviorism’s domination of American psychology was its successful claim to speak in the name of Science (with a capital “S”). And when many of the substantive doctrines of neobehaviorism fell into disrepute, its version of what constituted science did not necessarily suffer the same fate. Instead, neobehaviorist conceptions of scientific method survived and continued to exert a strong influence on subsequent research and theorizing.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Kurt Danziger, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, York University, Downsview, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3.

Is That It?
Book Author: Bob Geldof. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986
Reviewed by Steven E. Connelly, Indiana State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 593-598, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] With the possible exception of Mother Teresa, Bob Geldof is the most practical, as well as the most effective, humanitarian of this century. Geldof’s autobiography, Is That It?, provides some insight into the great mystery: how one individual, invested with no political power, allied with no great organization, and connected to no government, managed to triumph over the forces of greed, cynicism, chauvinism, bureaucratic red tape, and the often petty but formidable jealousies of international politics. Geldof’s life is no longer separable from his heroic efforts on behalf of famine relief in Africa, especially the Live Aid concert, billed by Rolling Stone as “The Day The World Rocked,” and certainly the most spectacular media event to this day. This scruffy, controversial lead singer of The Boomtown Rats generally had a reputation for being anti-establishment, if not anti-social-a punk anarchist whose antics and lyrics struck recklessly in every direction: hardly a likely candidate to mastermind what was at one and the same time the biggest live television event ever and a monument to human compassion.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Steven E. Connelly, Ph.D., Department of English, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809.

Night Life: The Interpretation of Dreams
Book Author: Liam Hudson. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986
Reviewed by Matthew C. Brennan, Indiana State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Autumn 1986, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 599-600, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] It is likely that Liam Hudson’s Night Life: The Interpretation of Dreams will meet resistance from many professional psychologists, for as a piece of research it is flawed: first, Hudson often documents sources so obscurely readers cannot tell where he starts using secondary material; second, he often refers to the “enemies” of the dream as “they” without saying who “they” are; and third-what is most troubling to researchers-Hudson often develops his case through speculative metaphors, not verifiable facts. However, Hudson’s intended audience includes not just the narrow field of professionals; he appeals “to an audience that is at heart broadly psychological: to those for whom the dream is inherently an object of fascination; to those eager to know how the imagination manages, against all odds, to subvert the dull tramp of habit.” For these audiences-and those fellow psychologists who realize their discipline is at heart hermeneutic (i.e., concerned with meaning)-Hudson offers here both a clear historical survey of competing approaches to dream interpretation and also a method that provocatively synthesizes them by drawing on not just either dream reports or laboratory experiments, but these sources and poems, novels, diagrams, and the dreamer’s biography as well.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Matthew C. Brennan, Ph.D., Department of English, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809.Save


Back to 1986